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The history of facilities master planning in the U.S. Navy dates
back 150 years. In 1825, Secretary of the Navy Samuel Southard noted
with alarm the rapidly deteriorating state of the nation's Naval yards
and recommended an urgent program of planning for their restoration.
Although this proposal was carried out, the succeeding maintenance of
the yards has been frustrated by a succession of encumbering circumstances,
The cycle of national conflict, marked by accelerated development; and
intervening periods of peace, characterized by relative somnolence;
has burdened the Navy with a physical plant that was, for the most part,
sporadically conceived, hastily built, and destined for ultimate neglect.
The present result is a vast inventory of facilities which are chaotically
arranged and are largely obsolete, unsightly, and even unsafe.
The rapid nationwide urbanization following World War II has
compounded the problem as the Navy is the "urbanite" of the armed
services. It is not only the most visible arm of the military, but is being
hemmed in by urban development at every coastal port location. Further
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problems have emerged in recent years with the sweeping growth of
social and environmental concern. The Navy is now obliged to set a
good example amid a host of constraints and, since we are in a period of
relative peace, with diminishing economic resources.
While master planning got an early start in the Navy, it did not
constitute a dedicated program until 1952, when the Master Shore Station
Development Program (MSSDP) was initiated. This effort lasted eight
years and was finally abandoned as a failure, being declared unrealistic,
ineffective and unmanageable.
Facilities planning became systematized in the Navy in 1960 when
the Shore Facilities Planning and Programming System (SFPPS) was
instituted as a component of the Defense Department's well-known
Planning, Programming, Budgeting System (PPBS). This system is still
in operation and has been quite successful in defining and quantifying
facilities requirements of Naval and Marine Corps installations, and in
programming for their satisfaction through the Military Construction
Program
.
The SFPPS did not specifically provide for facilities master planning,
however, being primarily quantitative in nature. The Navy's first
dedicated master planning directive was issued in June 1968, calling
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for a master plan to be developed for each major Naval and Marine
Corps shore installation and outlining the procedures and content for
such plans. The initial directive has been revised several times over
the years and has recently been superseded by a more comprehensive
instruction. While Navy facilities planning is essentially a technical
discipline with a strong physical orientation, the need for a qualitative
approach, considering social and environmental factors, as well as
efficiency and economy, has been reflected in the current directive.
The objective of this paper is to review the Navy's master planning
program, determine its strengths and weaknesses, assess both its value
to its beneficiaries and its effectiveness in meeting stated goals and
objectives, and recommend means to its improvement. The program has
been evaluated on the basis of relative goal attainment, adequacy of
required procedures and documentation, output and cost, value and
effectiveness, and implications for management. The evaluation was
conducted through review of Navy planning directives, interviews with
Navy planning personnel, research of applicable literature on planning
and program evaluation, and the conduct of a master planning survey
which solicited facts and opinions from three groups of program partici-
pants and beneficiaries by means of questionnaires.
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Most program evaluations compare two or more possible alternatives.
This evaluation is focused on a single, established program, thus is closer
to a terminal than a formative evaluation. It is actually a progress
evaluation in that the program is to continue for an indefinite future.
This research has sought ways to alter the program course, if necessary,
to reach its goals more directly.
The major findings and conclusions of the study are:
1 . The stated program goals , objectives and policies are either
too general or too limited in scope to provide a sound basis
for evaluation. The analysis has, therefore, been conducted
on the basis of "derived" criteria;
2. There is no clear statement of program purpose in the master
planning directives and this has supported an ongoing conflict
in ideology between program participants and beneficiaries;
3. The master planning methodology prescribed in the directives
is too restrictive to permit needed flexibility in application
to varying "real world" situations; furthermore, the master
plan documentation prescribed is too extensive to permit
timely output with available resources;
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4. As a result of growing demands for ancillary planning services,
the initial program targets for master plan output, in terms of
initial preparation and periodic updating, have not been met.
Increased productivity is essential to comply with the program
goals and objectives;
5. The total program cost has been estimated, but cannot be
meaningfully correlated to program output beyond a simple
cost-per-unit comparison. The cost of the program is
diminutive, however, in comparison to its potential value in
terms of savings;
6. The record of master plan implementation has proven the pro-
gram highly effective in defining facilities requirements and
guiding their realization through construction programming
consistent with approved plan concepts. The program has
been somewhat ineffective in anticipating and directing the
total subsequent physical development of installations; a high
percentage of initial master plan projects are eventually
dropped and then supplanted with new or substitute projects
with resulting non-conformities. The net result is considered
positive, but there is considerable room for improvement;
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7. The program beneficiaries believe that master planning has not
addressed their major perceived needs adequately and that the
completed documents are not as useful as they might be. The
inadequacy of available planning data is a major constraint to
master plan value and effectiveness;
8. A steady increase in planning workload, without a commensurate
increase in resources, has impaired the effective management of
the master planning program. A growing backlog of
unaccomplished workload suggests that means be found to
produce and maintain useable master plans more quickly.
Synthesis of these findings led to the fundamental conclusions that
(1) master plans take too long to prepare, (2) once prepared, they are
too vulnerable to misuse or neglect, and (3) they cannot adequately
predict or accommodate unforeseen change. All other factors are
peripheral and are included within these. Various solutions have been
proposed, but are often either unrealistic or in mutual conflict. Some
degree of trade-off is possible, and it could reduce, but not eliminate,
these basic problems.
Navy master plans are seen as multi-purpose entities which
must address a broad scope of concerns. They also must be flexible,
to accept incremental change without degradation of basic concepts.
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The conclusion is that the shortcomings of the present approach are
attributable to two underlying characteristics which are chronic and
which limit the opportunity for program reform. These are visualized
as institutional tendencies toward (1) prescriptive planning, which is
rigidly focused on a preconceived end-state and which attempts to
accomplish more than is realistically possible, or even required, and
(2) authoritarian planning, which isolates (and often alienates) the
program beneficiaries from the mainstream of planning activity, placing
them in a passive and subordinate role.
An integrated planning approach is recommended as the best
means to overcome the major shortcomings of the master planning program
The approach comprises three basic elements:
1 . Process planning, in which required procedures and initial
conrent are pared down to essentials, resulting in a more com-
pact and generalized plan document which is expanded
incrementally and updated on a continuous basis;
2. Policy planning, in which the master planning process and
all subsequent planning decisions are based on well-articulated
goals and policies for physical development, formulated at all
levels of management; and,
3. An expanded planning data base, in which present Naval infor-
mation systems are both augmented in scope and made readily
accessible to Navy planners.
The integrated planning approach is not a radical departure from
the current program structure—many of the elements are identical. The
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significant differences are in (1 ) the extent of detail considered (less
initially, but augmented over time according to need), (2) the assignment
of planning responsibilities (involving the installation as a program
"participant" rather than a "beneficiary"), (3) the order of accomplishment
(a new sequence based on priority of need and resource availability), and
(4) the concept of the master plan as an instrument of Navy policy (a
general guide rather than a detailed mandate for incremental decision-
making on physical development alternatives).
The integrated planning approach appears to have excellent
potential for speeding the production rate of master plans, bolstering their
immunity from mistreatment, and increasing their credibility and useful-
ness. Also, it would tend to minimize the impact of unexpected change
which erodes the value of prescriptive planning approaches and thus
the confidence that can be placed in the overall program. Moreover,
this approach seems to be highly applicable to conduct of broader based
planning studies, such as regional complex plans and logistics support
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PREFACE
There is a long history of master planning for Naval bases in the
United States. The following article, extracted from the "Navy
Construction Battallion Center Bulletin" of July 1959 and entitled,
"MASTER PLANNING, 1825", indicates the first formal recognition
of the need, the first direction for action, and the first master planning
accomplished by the Department of Defense. Also, it is interesting to
note the first departmental recognition of the tendency toward
obsolescence, and the need for updating of master plans.
"Master Planning is no new concept in the history of the
naval shore establishment.
"In the annual report of the Secretary of the Navy (Samuel
L. Southard), dated 2 December 1825, to the President and
transmitted with the President's message to Congress dated
6 December 1825, the following statement is made (American
State Papers, Naval Affairs, No. 268):
"
'Other difficulties have arisen, from the present disposition
of the building arrangements at our yards. They have,
heretofore, been improved by temporary expedients, and
the buildings erected and arranged with reference only to
existing necessities, and without regard to the future and
growing wants of our navy. Many and serious evils have
resulted; much public money has been unnecessarily
expended; many losses, sustained by the change, removal
and alteration of the several erections; timber exposed to
decay; stores requiring immense labor to deposit and pre-
serve them; a much larger number of hands required to
perform the work; unpleasant, and sometimes injurious
delays in fitting out our vessels. It is a mortifying fact,
yet there is no doubt of its truth, that one third of the
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money expended at our yards has been lost from this cause.
The remedy is manifest, and it is earnestly hoped that means
may be provided to apply."
Mr. Southard then described a program of planning and construction
for the modernization of the Navy's deteriorating shipyards:
"
'A commission of prudent and intelligent officers should
be selected, to examine minutely and carefully all our
navy yards, and to make a plan for each, suited to its
location and the future wants of tne service at it; pre-
scribing the building which will be required, and the
location and character of each building, together with
such improvements in the ground and form of the yard as
will be most beneficial. This plan, after being submitted
to the Department, and amended if necessary, and
approved, should be the guide in all future expenditures.*
"
'The expense of making such a plan, and erecting the
buildings necessary to execute it, would cost a large sum of
money, and increase the present expense of our naval
establishment; but the future saving to the nation, by
adopting and pursuing it rigidly, may be counted by
hundreds of thousands, perhaps by millions of dollars;
and the promptitude which would be created by it in all
our works, and especially in the fitting of our vessels,
would be felt in the efficiency of every part of the service.'"
Acting on Secretary Southard's proposal, Congress enacted a law
directing the President to insure that the Navy yards were examined by
a select board of officers, and that plans were prepared for their
improvement. After approval of the plans, no deviations were to be
made except by Presidential order. Under the President's direction,
*Emphasis mine,
the planning was accomplished for all Navy yards between May 1827
and some time in 1829. The yards then existant were those at
Portsmouth, N.H.; Charlestown, (Boston), Mass.; Brooklyn, N.Y.;
Philadelphia, Pa.; Gosport, (Norfolk), Va.; Washington, D.C.; and
Pensacola, Florida.
The article concludes with an excerpt from Preble's history,
written in 1890:
'"The plan for the Navy Yard of Charlestown was issued
from the Commissioners Office August 11 , 1828, and has
since governed the improvements in the Yard, with such
modifications as have been rendered necessary by the
improvements of science, and the changes in the equip-
ments, appliances and construction of vessels of war.
Railroads have taken the place of proposed canals, and
the introduction of steam, heavy ordnance and iron clads,
iron ships, have rendered other changes from the plan
necessary . ' "
Master planning not only had an early start in the U.S. Navy, it
got its direction from the highest executive level. Despite this history,
however, there has never been a dedicated, formal evaluation made of
the worth or effectiveness of such planning. According to a recent text
on program evaluation, "The notion of inefficiency in the federal
government is well established in the popular mind. " Because of this
widespread belief, and the steady demand for graduate research topics, a
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federal program which has never been evaluated is something of a
rarity. As a result, this research has become more of an original
effort than anticipated. It is an inquiry into the status of the work
begun by Secretary Southard 150 years ago.
This evaluation was not an easy task, as the material is largely
subjective in nature and often sensitive as well. Most evaluations
today, as another source claims, "focus on inputs and the management
process, rather than on whether the program is accomplishing its
2
intended purposes. This is readily explained when qualitative
analysis of a dynamic process is attempted on an essentially empirical
basis. The reason for the attempt is that, as the authors continue,
"Systematic program evaluations. . .appear to have considerable
potential for providing a much better guide than presently exists for
decisions on whether specific programs should be retained, modified,
3
expanded, or dropped."
Information sources for this study were primarily limited to those
surviving persons most familiar with the Program, and to articles
published in Navy technical journals. Those who have contributed
the background data for this paper are hereby acknowledged and thanked
for their valuable interest and support. They are:
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INTRODUCTION
A. OBJECTIVE: The objective of this study is to conduct a critical
review and analysis of the Navy's master planning program and to
evaluate it in regard to:
1 . Its consistency in meeting stated Navy objectives, goals and
policies, including the relevance of established procedures
and documentation to these ends;
2. Its effectiveness in responding to additional, related concerns
as determined by analysis of relevant social, economic and
environmental factors;
3. Its performance to date, in terms of master plan output and
associated costs;
4. Its capability to provide a usable, effective, quality product
or service to its multiple beneficiaries;
5. Its effectiveness in the implementation process; i.e., in
guiding subsequent physical development consistent with
master plan recommendations;
6. Its adaptability for efficient conduct within the local
planning office, considering prevailing management policies
and present resources and organizational structure; and,
7. Its implications for conduct of broader-based planning studies;
i.e., regional complex plans and logistics support systems plans
Determine the causes and degrees of success or failure within
each of these categories and provide recommendations for improvement
of the program
.
B. PURPOSE: The Navy's master plan program, originated in 1952,
has been modified frequently over the years. This has been in
response to: (1) changing conditions and events, both internal
and external, in such areas as national economy, military posture,
social awareness, environmental concern, and public and inter-
governmental relations; and (2) direct observation and monitoring
of the program output in terms of master plan quality and the rate
of accomplishment.
While the program directives are both explicit and compre-
hensive as to master planning requirements and procedures, there is
no provision for feedback and performance evaluation. As a
result, the measure of program value and effectiveness, indeed,
even the adequacy of program goals, can only be conjectured.
The purpose of this study is to provide a deeper insight into
certain basic concepts which have been debated, without resolution,
for almost 25 years. Some of the more salient issues involve
questions of:
1 . Program Objectives - what are the basic Navy goals
and policies which generated a need for master
planning and how well have these been complied
with? Also, who are the beneficiaries of the program
and what are their important needs?
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2. Program Directives - how relevant are the prescribed
master planning procedures and documentation to
fulfillment of beneficiary needs and basic Navy
goals and policy?
3. Program Output - how well have master planning
accomplishments met the assigned targets, in terms
of both quantity and quality?
4. Program Cost - what has master planning cost the
Navy to date, and how well have the funds been
used?
5. Program Effectiveness - how closely has the
implementation process adhered to master plan
recommendations, and how good were the
recommendations as a guide for subsequent
development?
6. Program Management - how effectively can the
master planning program be managed, within the
scope of available resources and prevailing
administrative policies?
These issues are each examined, in turn, in the major part of
this paper. It is not the purpose of this study to defend the Navy's
master planning program, nor to seek cause for its rejection. The
current approach is but the latest in a succession of attempts to
maximize the Navy's investment in its shore establishment. Each
point of departure in the program structure has resulted from the
recognition of changing requirements and of the need to meet them
through reform. Since change is in the very nature of things, it is
unlikely that any master planning approach can survive for more
than a few years. This research is based on the premise that,
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only through a better understanding of program strengths and
weaknesses - past and present - can better master planning be
achieved in the future.
C. APPROACH: This study has been conducted on a four-phase
approach:
1 . Review of the history and evolution of the Navy's master
planning program, noting changes in emphasis or requirements
and correlating these with the satisfaction of both stated goals
and objectives, and of prevailing additional needs. This has
been accomplished through review of available publications,
papers and correspondence on the subject, and interviews with
persons closely associated with the program.
2. Quantitative analysis of the program's performance in terms of
output and cost, and correlation of these with goal attainment
and derived benefits. This has been accomplished through
review of current statistical data, considering both historical
and projected performance.
3. Review and evaluation of the current Navy master plan
instruction on the basis of the:
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a. Accommodation of expressed and implied Navy policies;
b. Nature and extent of input data, field investigation and
interface between planners and installation personnel;
c. Method of planning analysis and concept development;
d. Method of plan presentation, review, approval and
distribution;
e. Format and contents of plan documentation;
f. Capability of master plans to meet military requirements
and installation development needs;
g. Response to impacts from and on the external environment;
h. Capability for orderly and effective plan implementation;
i. Adapability to use within the local planning office;
{. Implications for broader based planning studies.
This has been accomplished through data research,
personal interviews, personal experience, and a survey of
opinions from program participants and master plan beneficiaries,
Evaluative criteria have been selected according to the
nature of the subject matter analyzed. Normative criteria
have been used for measurement wherever possible; in its
absence, the evaluation has been made on the basis of
substantive inputs collected through the research process and,
where all else failed, empirically.
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4. Synthesis of findings and conclusions and recommendations
for program improvement. This was a rather straightforward
process once the components were assembled. It became
obvious, however, that not all of the problems uncovered
could be solved within a single approach. A number of
conflicts were discovered, between program goals and
policies, requirements and constraints. Possible tradeoffs
were identified and study of these led to the discovery of
some underlying causes and effects which limit the
opportunities for significant program reform. The con-
cluding recommendations attempt to cope with the most
pressing needs of the master planning program without
radical departure from established policy or procedures.
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PARTI. BACKGROUND
A. The Navy Planning Organization
B. Evolution of the Navy Planning System
C. Recent Impacts on the System
D. Comparative Planning Concepts
E. Information Sources
PART I: BACKGROUND
A. THE NAVY PLANNING ORGANIZATION
Naval Facilities Engineering Command has responsibility for the
planning, engineering, design, construction and management of all
Naval and most Marine Corps shore facilities, worldwide. Specifically,
"shore facilities" include real estate, buildings, structures, utilities
systems, and certain items of equipment.
NAVFAC, as it is called, is one of five Systems Commands com-
prising the Naval Materiel Command, which furnishes technical and
2
logistic support to shore activities and the Fleet operating forces.
Organization of the Navy Department and the Naval Materiel Command
are shown on Figures 1 and 2.
NAVFAC Headquarters is located in Alexandria, Virginia, and
Command responsibilities are discharged through six Engineering Field
Divisions, or EFD's, located around the coastal perimeter of the
continental United States, and in Hawaii. Smaller branch offices are
located in other areas of substantial Naval activity. Locations of the
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Although geographic factors impose diverse operational requirements
on the different EFD's, their organization and functions are substantially
uniform. For illustrative purposes, the planning operations at Western
Division, or WESTNAVFAC, are described in the following paragraphs.
WESTNAVFAC is located in San Bruno, California, and is the largest of
the EFD's.
WESTNAVFAC has technical responsibility for all Naval and most
Marine Corps shore facilities in the Eleventh, Twelfth and Thirteenth
Naval Districts; which include the states of Washington, Oregon,
California, Arizona, Nevada, Utah, Idaho, Montana and Alaska.
This area embraces a 3,500 mile coastline and extends through five time
zones
.
Command responsibilities are fulfilled through three operating
departments - Facilities Planning, Facilities Acquisition, and Facilities
Management - which are staffed by ten Naval officers and 650 civilian
personnel. Although command and staff are centralized in San Bruno,
branch offices are maintained in Seattle and San Diego, and field
construction representatives are deployed at various locations throughout
3
the geographic area served.
The Facilities Planning Division, a component of the Planning
Department, is organized into two branches - Requirements Planning and
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Master Planning. The Requirements Planning branch has a staff of about
15 professional and technical personnel which work with planning factors
and criteria, engineering evaluation of facilities assets, project review
and validation, construction programming, and environmental impact
assessment and review. The Master Planning branch has a professional
and technical staff of about 25 which conduct and administer the prepara-
tion of installation master plans, regional complex plans, and special
planning studies; perform facility siting reviews and certifications, and
coordinate master plan implementation. Each branch is subdivided into
sections, with responsibilities assigned along functional or geographic
lines as appropriate.
The magnitude of planning responsibility assigned to WESTNAVFAC
may be illustrated with some statistics. The 186 Naval and Marine Corps
installations within the geographic purview comprise 5,320 square miles
of area and support a combined resident and employed population of 470,000
people (252,000 military personnel, 104,000 civilian employees and
5
114,000 military dependents, living in military quarters on federal land).
This planning responsibility can thus be compared in scale, roughly,
with a governmental entity such as Fresno County, California. In
actuality, however, the geographic dispersion of Naval activities within
the three Naval Districts served creates a much more complex environment
for planning than does a cohesive territory. In addition to supporting some
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375 separate Naval and Marine Corps shore activities and fleet commands
,
and 25 different management offices, WESTNAVFAC interfaces with nine
state governments, 85 county governments, three state coastal commissions,
ten port authorities, at least five regional governments, and a multitude
of school and other special districts, commissions, and other federal
. 6
agencies.
Another measure of the growth of Navy planning is reflected in the
size, role and status of the planning organization at WESTNAVFAC; an
evolution paralleled throughout the system. In the early 1950's, the
planning functions were accomplished by a section within the Civil
Engineering Branch of the Design Division; responsibilities were limited
principally to mapping and facility siting. In the late 1950's, planning
was established as a separate branch within the Design Division and had
a staff of about ten people.
With the inception of the Shore Facilities Planning and Programming
System (SFPPS) in 1960, the Planning Division was formed, consisting of
two branches - Facilities Planning and Civil Defense. The latter function
was oriented toward contingency, or mobilization planning, and disaster
preparedness, reflecting the prevailing national concern over the advent
of nuclear war. Duties of the Facilities Planning Branch were expanded
to accommodate the multiple administrative requirements of the SFPPS,
o
and the staff had grown to about 15.
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In 1970, the growing economic austerity in the federal agencies
resulted in a consolidation of Naval engineering offices, worldwide.
Ten EFD's were consolidated to six, and a single office, to serve the
entire western portion of the United States, was established in San Bruno.
It was at this point that planning achieved departmental status, absorbing
both the Facilities Planning and Real Estate divisions as subordinate
functions. The Facilities Planning Division now has a staff of 48 people
9
and a greatly expanded role.
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B. EVOLUTION OF THE NAVY PLANNING SYSTEM
There are, today, 763 separate Naval and Marine Corps shore
installations in the Continental United States. These "bases", as they
are called, contain an aggregate of 4,161 ,309 acres of land and 82,373
buildings and structures, totalling 536,123,000 square feet in area.
These buildings and structures cost the government $5,616,417,000,
and have an estimated replacement value of almost $20 billion. The
total cost of land and utilities is $10,087,032,000.
Prior to World War II, many of these installations did not exist as
military property. The urgent needs of national defense, driven by the
mobilization effort during the war years, resulted in a base acquisition,
development and expansion program unrivaled in military history.
Expedience and productivity were the order of the day.
As a result of this accelerated construction program, Naval bases
were developed without regard to long range planning goals and
12
facilities expansion was, understandably, haphazard.
With the return to peacetime in the late 1940's, the Navy found
itself with a tremendous inventory of physical assets, much of which had
been sporadically conceived, hastily built, and surplus to then-present
15 —
needs. Many of these assets, built "for the duration", were vacated
and placed in caretaker status, awaiting further developments or policy
. . . 13
decisions.
These assets were reactivated during the Korean War in the early
1950's, and were augmented with additional construction, as dictated
by prevailing needs.
The several years of peace that followed the end of the Korean War
permitted a careful evaluation of military needs and assets. As a logical
result of this analysis, it was concluded that:
1 . The physical inventory of military property was attaining
very large proportions and a workable system of
management must be developed;
2. The "image" of defense installations must be upgraded
to accommodate the demands of a peacetime military
force which was increasingly voluntary and of professional
status;
3. The best way to satisfy these demands was to institute a
program for comprehensive, long range facilities
planning, programming and implementation. '^
— 16
Facilities planning in the Navy got its real start in September 1952
through the Master Shore Station Development Program (MSSDP).
Although this program was somewhat comprehensive in scope, addressing
the total projected facilities development needs of the various installa-
tions, it was hampered by inadequate management. This was due both
to a general pre-occupation with the Korean War and subsequent
demilitarization, and to a scope and methodology which could not be
handled efficiently by the assigned staff.
The MSSDP vested authority for determination of facilities require-
ments, evaluation of existing assets, and preparation of "master plans"
for projected physical development, in the command of each installation.
NAVFAC (then known as the Bureau of Yards and Docks) was
only indirectly involved in the process, as technical consultant to the
1
8
installations' public works departments.
In theory, the program appeared reasonable, but in practice the
planning tasks delegated to the staff were voluminous and the output of
paperwork became a burden to all levels of participation. More
importantly, the separate determination of facilities requirements by each
command often resulted in excessive estimates of needs, which could not
possibly be satisfied with prospective appropriations. By the late
— 17 —
1950's, the MSSDP was recognized to be unrealistic and ineffective; it
was subsequently pronounced a failure, and "master planning" disappeared
for a few years.
Navy planning became systematized in I960, when the Secretary of
the Navy issued a directive establishing the Naval Shore Facilities
20
Planning and Programming System, called SFPPS. This action was
strongly influenced by the policies of (then) Secretary of Defense Robert
McNamara, incorporating the principles of the Planning, Programming,
Budgeting System (PPBS) developed for the Department of Defense (DOD) by
21
the Rand Corporation. Friedmann notes the success of PPBS in the DOD
22
and cites it as a "clear instance of al locative planning." A represen-
tative of the Rand Corporation has stated, "Centrally controlled planning
in the DOD since 1961 must be regarded as one of the major planning
23
experiments of all time."
In April 1960, the Chief of Naval Operations implemented the
Secretary's directive by developing a format and methodology for the
24
SFPPS and tasking NAVFAC with administrative responsibility. This
was a milestone event in Naval facilities planning, which promised to
bring needed order to a chaotic situation (much as Secretary Southard
25
had perceived in 1825).
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The system was highly rational, proceeding from the broad to the
specific. Total projected Navy force structure and various operating
plans were reviewed at headquarters level to determine overall mission
requirements and logistic support needs on a broad geographic basis.
These were then translated into mission and tasks, and workload and
staffing levels for individual installations.
The system was intended to eliminate the excessive and often
superfluous project requests typical of the earlier, (MSSDP), program,
and to limit construction expenditures to only the most essential needs
of the installations on a priority basis. Order and austerity were the
keynotes of the system, and aesthetic considerations were barely
acknowledged.
The thrust of the SFPPS, initially, was confined to:
1 . Statistical derivation and quantification of those facilities
required by an installation to accomplish its assigned mission,
tasks and workload, and to accommodate its assigned
personnel and equipment. This was accomplished through use
of established planning factors and criteria contained primarily
in NAVFAC Manual P-80, "Facilities Planning Factors for
Naval Shore Activities".
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2. Quantification and evaluation of existing facilities assets;
3. Determination of facilities excesses and deficiencies;
4. Disposition of excess assets, through demolition or disposal;
and,
5. Programming of new construction to satisfy the computed
facilities deficits.
These tasks were performed by the NAVFAC EFD with assistance
from the respective installation, but the total process was executed in
17 separate steps involving a wide variety of inputs. Figure 4 depicts
the organization and functional cycle of the SFPPS.
Despite the obvious improvements in statistical quantification of
needs and inventory, the SFPPS experienced growing pains. An excellent
if highly critical analysis was made in July 1964 in which weaknesses
27
were noted in each step. Among other things, the system placed little
emphasis on physical design aspects such as facilities siting and land use,
28
and master planning was non-existent in the system.
In 1961, NAVFAC published its Manual P-340, "Procedures for
Planning Naval Shore Facilities", which outlined technical planning
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Development Maps for every Naval and Marine Corps Installation.
These maps, while showing existing and proposed facilities, along with
pertinent regional and vicinal factors, were not "master plans". They
did not evolve from a comprehensive analysis of physical and environ-
mental considerations within and around the installation and, as a
result, were subject to frequent change. The General Development Maps
were not accompanied by a text and were thus unable to address
qualitative issues, such as planning policies, goals, objectives or con-
cepts for facilities development. Annual updates were specified and
29
were required to maintain currency.
The NAVFAC P-340 manual defined "technical planning" as "a
process to determine the land and physical facilities needed to satisfy
military operational and functional requirements. It includes the analysis
and evaluation of land, water area and air space; site selection; deter-
mination of buildings, structures and other improvements best suited to
satisfy the facility requirements; design of the physical arrangement of
the facilities; and, assurance of the engineering and construction
feasibility of the proposed development." While this definition relates
to "master planning" in the Navy concept, the term, "technical planning",
was defined as an aspect of "civil engineering", reflecting the pervading
orientation of the bureau management. This situation lasted for seven
years.
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To accommodate the recognized need for a dedicated physical and
environmental analysis of installation development, NAVFAC published,
in 1968, the Navy's first real master planning directive. This
instruction describes a process for master planning of Naval shore
installations, to assure their present and future capability to accept the
required facilities in an efficient and appropriate manner.
The master planning instruction was given strong support by the
31
adoption of the Logistic Support Requirements system in 1967. This
system was designed to identify all tasks, functions and workload to be
accomplished by an installation over a projected eight year period. The
LSR system, as it is known, provided, through a detailed questionnaire
format, projected operational workload in terms of mission, tasks and
functions; installation organization and staffing requirements; functional
inter-relationships, both internal and external; loading plans, equipment
allowance lists and workload analysis. The basic document, once pre-
pared by the installation and approved through chain-of-command
review, was to be maintained current. It's primary benefits to master
planning were to (1) furnish a wealth of current organizational and
operational data in usable form and (2) extend the projected time horizon
for planning clearly into the "mid-range" period; i.e., three years
32
beyond earlier five-year projections.
— 23 —
Unfortunately, the LSR system fell short of its promise and was
abandoned in 1973; there simply was not sufficient manpower available
at the installations to effectively compile and maintain the data required.
The LSR system suffered from the same malady that had disabled the
33
Master Shore Station Development Program 15 years earlier.
The Navy master planning instruction is now being revised and
expanded to provide for planning of regional complexes, such as the
Naval Base in San Diego which, with 18 separate installations, is the
largest military complex in the United States; and of logistics support
34
systems, such as ordnance, RDT&E, supply, etc., on a Navy-wide basis.
The original instruction has been amended several times over the
years in response to changing conditions in the Department of Defense
and to reflect the impact of changing policies and attitudes on a nation-
wide basis; for example, the growth of environmental concern and the
onset of economic austerity in federal spending. The main thrust of each
35
update was to equate master planning productivity with available resources.
The consolidation of NAVFAC EFD's in July 1970 resulted in much larger
geographic areas to serve, without a commensurate increase in staff.
There was a real dilemma in accommodating a growing workload with a
limited and stable work force. The original master plan instruction called
for "preliminary" and "final" master plans, the latter to be prepared only
when required and directed by Headquarters. A subsequent revision, in
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1971, specified "Phase I" and "Phase II" master plans; the latter, again,
subject to special authorization. The "preliminary" and "Phase I" master
plans were essentially proposed land use plans, with detailed siting
limited to facilities of high importance or interest. "Final" and "Phase
II" plans provided siting configuration for all approved facilities
requirements. In retrospect, few "final" or "Phase II" master plans were
completed, but the "preliminary" and "Phase I" plans required perhaps
36
three-quarters of the total effort. The instruction also required all
targeted master plans to be completed within a five year schedule, and
then to be updated on a three year schedule, resources permitting.
37
Resources have not permitted the realization of this goal.
At each successive revision, the Navy planning system has become
more complex and comprehensive; new and more detailed planning
factors and criteria have been incorporated, new and longer forms are
used for analysis and reporting, and the scope of planning purview has
been expanded both internally (intra-station) and externally (to include
the installation environs).
In its earliest years, the Naval planning system reflected a some-
what autonomous establishment in which decisions could be made and
actions accomplished in a relative vacuum. Although a directive for
"regional planning" was issued in 1955, most planning was performed
— 25 —
on an individual installation basis, with little regard to the interface
between either the installation and its military neighbors or relatives,
or the installation and the surrounding civilian community. This
approach exemplified "insular" planning, in which the military
establishment was presumed to function in a totally isolated environ-
ment - a concept that could not meet the demands of today's urban
. 38
situation.
Current revisions to the Navy's master plan instruction emphasize
a higher concern for environmental issues and a higher level of inter-
face between the military and civilian communities. Considering the
typical urban waterfront location of most Naval activities, it would
appear that the system is maturing in a responsive, articulate manner.































































FiGURE 5: THE NAVY MASTER PLANNING PROCESS
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C. RECENT IMPACTS ON THE SYSTEM
To afford a clearer perspective of the Navy planning universe, the
following paragraphs summarize some of the recent impacts that have
shaped the current approach. These impacts can be viewed as emanating
from two directions: internal, from within the defense establishment, and
external , from other governmental agencies or the civilian community.
1 . Significant internal impacts include:
a. The Shore Establishment Realignment program, announced in
April 1973, without prior disclosure, resulting in base closures
and realignments on a Navy-wide basis;
b. The cessation of United States involvement in Vietnam, returning
thousands of military personnel to stateside duty and the Navy
to peacetime status. This action resulted in a smaller Navy
worldwide, but a heavier concentration of operations at
domestic port locations;
c. The growth of national economic austerity, requiring severe
cutbacks in Navy funding and calling for a diligent examina-
tion of development priorities;
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d. The adoption, by the Department of Defense, of heavy and
wide ranging environmental policies, requiring a re-shuffling
of fiscal priorities in the Navy, and of technical planning
responsibilities throughout the NAVFAC organization. The
Secretary of the Navy issued a directive in 1972 establishing
procedures for compliance with the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969, and requiring preparation of an
Environmental Impact Assessment for all construction projects
39
submitted for Congressional authorization and appropriation.
An Environmental Impact Statement is required wherever a
significant impact is contemplated;
e. The inception of computerized planning data, covering
installation facilities requirements, physical plant inventory,
facilities excesses and deficiencies, and Military Construction
Program Objectives. This step provides more current data,
faster data retrieval, and more flexibility in data format
through use of various printout configurations;
f. New and more restrictive facility siting criteria, limiting con-
struction in areas subject to high noise levels from aircraft
operations, seismic activity, and explosive safety hazards.
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2. Significant external impacts include:
a. The issuance of Executive Order 11508 in 1972, in which
federal properties (primarily military) were to be scrutinized
to determine what may be excess to departmental needs. This
policy, implemented through the General Services Administra-
tion, which is conducting an on-going survey of federal land,
has resulted in the declaration as excess, of considerable
military property which was alledgedly being put to less than
its highest and best use. The Chief of Naval Operations has
required all Naval installations to prepare and maintain real
property utilization maps and reports showing how their land is
being used, or proposed for use;
b. The adoption of restrictive environmental policies by other
governmental agencies - federal, state and local - with which
the Navy must comply, or attempt to comply, depending on
the level of jurisdiction applicable^
c. The continued growth in size and density of coastal urban
areas, which impacts ever more heavily on the Navy as a prime
user of water and shoreline resources, requiring a continual
survey of actual and potential encroachments;
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d. The issuance of Office of Management and Budget Circular
A-95 in 1969, which directed all federal agencies to coordinate
their planning and development programs with those of local
agencies. This directive set up "regional clearinghouses",
usually the area council of governments, to review and
coordinate federal projects having impacts on the local environ-
ment. This procedure has had a pronounced effect on the Navy
in urban coastal areas by giving strong public visibility to
military development plans.
3. Within the purview of Navy planning, these issues have required
major adjustments to the modus operandi:
a. An expeditious review of land use development and management
policies and of facilities planning programs for which the impetus
was not anticipated;
b. A deferral of many desirable, but less essential, construction
projects requiring adjustments to implementation plans and
schedules;
c. A realignment of planning resources, both people and money,
to meet the challenges impelled by the growth of environmental
concern in both the public (governmental) and private (community)
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sectors. The net effect has been the deferral of targeted, on-
going planning projects in favor of non-targeted, "brush fire"
planning (or quasi planning) efforts which require immediate
response.
4. Some of the more formidable and imaginative programs that have
originated within the Navy planning community are:
a. The Base Attractiveness program, instituted by the Chief of
Naval Operations to improve the external appearance of
Naval installations and to encompass broader Defense Depart-
ment objectives regarding the improvement of the total
41
environment and quality of life at military bases;
b. The Air Installations Compatible Use Zones program, originated
by the Navy to protect essential Naval and Marine Corps air
stations against urban encroachment, and to assure compatible
42
land use for both the military and civilian communities;
c. Regional planning for Naval complexes, conducted along
functional lines, to address multiple activity requirements and
problem areas on a macro-planning basis;
— 32
d. Systems planning for Naval logistics support functions, con-
ducted on a coastwide or Navy-wide basis, as applicable, to
determine optimal shore support capability for response to the
needs of the operating forces afloat;
e. Advocacy planning, in appropriate circumstances, to identify
the various actors in a complex planning issue and to under-
stand and appreciate their legitimate, but often divergent,
viewpoints;
f. Process planning, an alternative to the end-state document
approach, which lends credibility to facilities planning as a
45
continual and dynamic, rather than a static, activity.
The Navy planning universe has expanded considerably in the last
few years, and it is not likely to shrink. Meeting the multitude of demands
in a competent and timely manner has not been an easy task and has not
been uniformly successful. In attempting to do so, however, the posture
of Navy planning has been changed in an almost revolutionary manner.
The practice of technical master planning has absorbed the additional
roles of program management and public relations marketing. The Navy
planner is now deeply involved in public hearings, public presentations,
inter-agency rap sessions, and other quasi political activities that were
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unimaginable ten years ago. Insular planning appears to be gone forever,
and the Navy now plans as part of the total community.
The following sections of this paper examine the past performance
and current direction of the Navy's master planning program and provide
some guidelines for future management policy.
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D. COMPARATIVE PLANNING CONCEPTS
The case for long range, comprehensive planning, originated in the
late 1920's and advocated by T . J. Kent and others into the early 1960's,
has since fallen into a state of disrepute. When an institution falls, it
usually falls hard, and the classic planning model has suffered scathing
criticism in recent years. It has been pronounced not only misdirected
and ineffective, but the source of critical damage to the general public
and the planning profession alike.
The classic planning model, as the Kentian approach has been termed,
conceives a predictable and desirable end-state to which all policies and
programs should be oriented. The principal tenets of this concept are
that the master plan, or general plan, should be:
1 . "Comprehensive", in that it includes all physical aspects of the
environment, considering economic, social, cultural and political
factors which determine physical needs and their means of satisfaction;
2. "Long-range", in that it looks as far as possible into the future and,
depending on personal interpretation, either seeks to accommodate
the predicted community needs at that point in time, or to shape a
future environment which will be appropriate to those preconceived
needs;
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3. "General", in that it is a "guide", rather than a "program", for
physical development. In this regard, it accommodates incremental
change with minimal revision by avoiding the specific issues of cost,
procedure and schedules, and;
4. "Physically oriented", in that it focuses on considerations of private
land use, circulation and public facilities and, more recently,
46
housing, recreation, open space, public transit, etc.
This traditional planning approach has guided the efforts of the great
majority of local planning offices around the county and, as will be seen,
the Navy's planning establishment as well. It is an outgrowth of the
technical disciplines from which it originated; i.e., architecture,
engineering, landscape architecture, and is thus characterized by a
well ordered and somewhat static orientation. The physical bias of urban
planning was focused by the Housing Act of 1954 (Article 701 ), sustained
by the curricula of all major planning schools and endorsed by the
47
American Institute of Planners until 1967.
In general, the opponents of the concept argue that it is, at best,
inappropriate to the real needs of contemporary urban society and
designed for failure. At worst, it is an elitist exercise in futility which
is supported by dominant and reactionary political interests.
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Specifically, they maintain that the future is impossible to predict
with any degree of reliability; that "comprehensiveness", while needed,
is mis-stated in the Kentian doctrine; that a focus on physical develop-
ment is inadequate to cope with diverse human needs in a pluralistic,
democratic society; and, that a scope "general" enough to avoid frequent
amendment renders the plan useless in a real world situation.
The critics claim that the scale of urban problems demands a sense
of urgency in their approach, thus a focus on immediate or short-range
objectives; the scope of urban problems demands at least equal consid-
ation of social, economic, cultural, political and environmental factors,
thus a truly interdisciplinary approach; and, the structure of urban
society demands a high level of citizen involvement, thus a multiple
advocacy approach. Furthermore, they attack the "comprehensive -
general" dichotomy on the basis that the terms are mutually exclusive.
The most frequent criticism is with the matter of implementation; that
plans don't get implemented because they are not politically feasible.
The realities of the political context in which the master plan is placed
demand that it be both specific , to be of any real use for decision-
making in the legislative body, and flexible , so as to not bind the hands
of elected public officials responding to their constituents.
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The thrust of the attack on the classic planning model has come,
understandably, from the planning profession itself. It is not necessary
here to review the specific charges and their rationale, but the more
common themes can be summarized. They are characterized by an
intriguing and colorful display of terminology.
The classic planning model has been termed, "a I locative" planning
by Friedmann, in which limited public goods are distributed in a zero
sum game; "rational" planning by Braybrooke and Lindblom, which
purports a single best answer to each of myriad and complex problems,
while real world decision making plods along as "disjointed
49
incremental ism"; "end-state" planning by Davidoff, involving
50
Utopian approaches developed by "value -neutral idealists";
"detached" planning by Hansen, who berates the typical separation of
51
planning from actual decision-making; "technocratic" planning by
Toffler, which is described as "econcentric, short-sighted and
52
undemocratic." ' Meyerson, Banfield and Altshuler, among others,
have also commented eloquently on the dire state of the art, as
53
summarized by Bolan in his excellent article of 1967.
The literature, however, is not solely a counsel of despair. In
response to this "crisis", new approaches have been set forth by the
more sensitive critics. Branch speaks of "continuous planning" as a
— 38 —
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"process" in lieu of a "product"; Davidoff calls for "advocacy
planning" as a means to democratic decision making in a pluralistic
55
society; * Fagin advocates "policy planning" as a way to get political
56
support for plan affectuation; Friedmann defines "innovative
planning" as a radical, action-oriented approach to contemporary
57
problem solving; ' and, Toffler creates a "strategy of social futurism",
which expands the scope and horizon of traditiona.1 planning and
58
examines a host of possible future environments. More conservatively,
Altshuler speaks of the need for "mid-range" planning, with the promise
59
of higher professional credibility, and Bo Ian calls for a reconsideration
of the "rational planning model", based on recent advances in the field
.... 60
ot policy science.
The list could go on, but that isn't necessary. While the terminology
is imaginative and varied, the new concepts have much in common.
They all emphasize the need for responsiveness to numerous and diverse
requirements and for flexibility in accommodating ever-changing condi-
tions and attitudes. This implies a highly political and generalized role
for the planner, aimed at coordination, motivation and problem solving,
rather than a specialized role aimed at prediction, prescription and
allocation.
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The Navy's master plan program is aligned with the classic planning
model, having all the requisite qualities defined by Kent. There are
two reasons for this: (1) the Navy's program was formulated in the mid-
1960's, after the Kentian approach had peaked but before it had plunged;
and, (2) the Navy's program is highly adaptive to this concept, having
considerable opportunity to make it work. For example:
1 . The Navy, as an arm of the Department of Defense, is an
autocratic, "closed" society, which affords a high level of
control over policy and goal formulation with minimal social
or political intervention;
2. Funding for construction is relatively assured and proceeds
from a single source of allocation; thus, economies are viewed
in a relative rather than an absolute sense and implementation
is a systematic, if drawn out, process;
3. Defense planning, programming and budgeting are highly
systematized so that projections can be made with a greater
degree of confidence than in the civilian sector; and,
4. Military ideology stresses order, efficiency and uniformity,
all of which are compatible with the classic planning model
and which are supported by the technical and physical
orientation of the Navy's master planning approach.
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The fundamental thrust in military facilities planning is the
accommodation of national defense requirements and all other issues are
subordinate. The achievement of an efficiently organized shore
establishment is considered of primary importance in this pursuit; thus,
the case for long range, comprehensive, physically-oriented planning
is stated.
Despite this apparent congruity, however, the Navy's master
planning program has, in practice, experienced many of the pitfalls
ascribed to the classic planning model. It has been impacted by
changing social and economic conditions and by environmental con-
cerns, with the result that long range forecasting is far from reliable
and plan implementation is protracted and erratic. These issues are
discussed in the following sections to determine whether the criticisms





The data used in Part II, "Analysis and Critique", consist of (1)
statistical information on master planning costs and accomplishments
obtained from NAVFAC headquarters, and (2) professional opinions
obtained from persons directly involved with the Navy master planning
program, civilian staff planners employed by the Navy, civilian planners
who have worked under planning service contracts to the Navy, and
military or civilian personnel at installations having a history of
experience with Navy master plans.
Supporting information was obtained from the NAVFAC Command
Management Plan for FY 1976, a "Delphi" survey on master planning
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conducted by NAVFAC headquarters in 1972, various Navy planning
directives, a "Market Survey" of NAVFAC services and customer
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support conducted in 1975, the NAVFAC 10-Year Command History
64
(Shore Facilities Planning), and published articles and official and
personal correspondence as appropriate.
Professional opinions were solicited by means of questionnaires pre-
pared exclusively for and distributed to selected representatives of each
survey group. Responses were tabulated and analyzed, and consensus
opinions have been used as the basis for the following evaluation.
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The questionnaires were structured to obtain both fixed and open-
end responses, depending on the information desired. Multiple-choice,
fixed-response questions were predominant to establish consistency in
evaluation; open-end questions were used wherever the possibility
existed for unanticipated responses. All questions were neutrally coded
to minimize response set and were sequenced in "hourglass" mode,
moving from general to specific and back to general. This format pro-
vides maximum reliability for evaluative purposes.
Where quantified responses were desired, participants were asked to
rate the item numerically, on a "l-to-5" basis, with "1" representing
the most positive response, "5" the most negative response, and "3" a
neutral position.
The survey is referred to as the "Master Planning Survey" in the
following sections. Completed questionnaires, indicating the consensus
of each survey group, are furnished as Appendix B.
The Architect-Engineer survey questionnaire was sent to six firms
which have accomplished master plans under contract to the Navy.
Under this arrangement, the contractor performs all planning tasks
required by the basic instructions, in accordance with a scope of work
prepared by Navy planners, and under the direction of a Navy planner-
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in-charge. The contract is normally terminated upon acceptance of
the completed master plan, and implementation is administered "in-
house" by Navy planners.
Of the six firms solicited, only three responses were obtained, but
these were suitable for analysis. Responses were reasonably credible
and complete. Of 108 possible items, 103 were answered and, of
these, 18 indicated a misunderstanding of the question or type of
response desired. The questionnaire was sent by letter to the principal
of each firm, and all replies were completed by that person.
The master plans prepared by these three firms were completed
between June 1974 and October 1975, but were prepared according to
the earlier (1971) master plan instruction. Only one of the three master
plans has been approved by the Chief of Naval Operations.
The Installation survey questionnaire was sent to 12 Naval installa-
tions located in the Eleventh, Twelfth and Thirteenth Naval Districts.
Nine responses were received from eight installations, (one respondent
submitted two replies), which formed the basis for analysis.
Responses were generally very credible and complete. Of 279
possible items, 255 were answered and, of these, only ten indicated a
misunderstanding of the question or type of response desired. The
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questionnaires were sent by letter to the commanding officer or
equivalent official at each installation, soliciting a command position
on all items. The replies, however, appear to have been prepared and
returned by staff personnel, presumably in the civil engineering or
facilities planning departments.
Responses were received from three Naval air stations, two Naval
weapons stations, two ordance RDT&E activities, and one regional
medical center, thus furnishing a good cross-section of functional
categories. These installations have master plans prepared between
April 1966 and March 1974, all of which have been approved by the
Chief of Naval Operations.
Since approval of the master plan, three of the nine installations
stated a significant change in mission or tasks; two, an increase in work-
load; two, a decrease in workload; and, two, a decrease in base loading,
Only one installation reported no significant changes in these items.
Five of the installations reported no significant change in the
surrounding environment. Those noting changes referred mainly to
physical growth and development, increased environmental concern
within the community, and additional layers of government - all of
which presumably impacted on the installation in some manner.
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The NAVFAC questionnaire was sent to each of the NAVFAC
Engineering Field Divisions (EFD's) and to Headquarters, which have,
collectively, prepared 108 master plans and regional complex plans.
Of this total, 82 plans were prepared "in-house", the balance by
planning service contract.
Responses were received from headquarters and all but one EFD,
and the results were very credible and complete. Of 576 possible
items, 552 were answered and, of these, 38 indicated a misunder-
standing of the question or the type of response desired. The
questionnaires were sent to, and completed by, the master planning
branch manager of each office.
NAVFAC headquarters and each EFD operate under somewhat
different conditions regarding management policies, staffing, workload
and nature of total planning responsibilities. These were reflected in
the various responses. For example, NAVFAC headquarters does not
have an assigned geographic area, and does not administer general
development maps or site review and approval within the master
planning branch. They do all master planning "in-house", assisting the
various EFD's according to priorities and manpower availability. Head-
quarters has a considerable responsibility to the Department of Defense,
Chief of Naval Operations, Secretary of Defense, Secretary of the
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Navy, Materiel Command Systems Commands, and other bureau commands
and offices. Furthermore, the headquarters response to questions
regarding the value of the master plan instruction revealed a strong
positive bias; understandable, considering that they wrote it. Atlantic
and Pacific Divisions administer substantial work in foreign countries
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PART II: ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE
A . PROGRAM OBJECTIVES
Objective and Criteria : Define the objectives, goals and policies
of the Navy's master planning program and estimate the extent to which
they have been met or complied with.
The evaluation is based on review of the Naval Facilities
Engineering Command (NAVFAC), Command Management Plan,
applicable Navy planning directives, and responses to the master
planning survey conducted for this paper.
Background: "The Command Management Plan is the basic planning
document of the Naval Facilities Engineering Command. It reflects the
Command's philosophy of management by programs and management by
objectives. This management process compliments the Planning,
Programming, Budgeting System of the Department of Navy and the
Department of Defense . " So says the Commander
.
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The Command Management Plan describes the various programs
which, collectively; make up the total NAVFAC responsibility, state
the basic Command objectives, define the intermediate goals for
each component program, and explain the Command policies for
accomplishment of each program
.
Intermediate goals are focused on considerations of product, service,
support, improvement, and performance. Product and service goals
concern "externalities", or support of customers while the other three
relate to internal functions of the organization. Product, improvement
and performance goals are measurable; the other two are not. Specific
resource allocations are made toward product, service and support goals
and, occasionally, to improvement goals. Performance goals are, in
effect, measures of accomplishment toward the other four goals and are
not separately funded.
Master planning is not really a separate program, but an element
of a larger program - Planning and Real Estate. It is, therefore, a
sub-program which possesses the characteristics of a full program in that
specific goals are stated for its execution.
The basic Command objective applicable to master planning is,
"to ensure that the shore facilities and fixed ocean facilities necessary
to support the Navy are available at the best balance between require-
2
ment and economy." The language is straightforward, but doesn't
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lend itself to penetrating analysis. The only real implication for
master planning is the suggestion of an austere approach.
The Command product goals for master planning consist of annual
targets for preparation and updating; service and support goals address
master planning only indirectly; improvement goals ccfll for development
of a concept for regional and systems master planning teams; and,
performance goals are to "limit effort devoted to 'untargeted studies' to
15% of planning effort", and to "reduce the backlog of master plans greater
3
than five years old to 20% of total." Accomplishment of product and
performance goals is discussed in Section C, "Program Output", and
improvement goals are discussed in Section F., "Program Management".
Command policies applicable to master planning are that:
1 . "Shore installation and facilities planning will be performed
'in-house' to the maximum extent practicable";
2. "Planning for the provision of shore installations and facilities
will be accomplished in time to provide a basis for orderly
programming and budgeting";
3. "Planning studies will be sensitive to environmental and
community-oriented constraints, with consideration given
to the social and economic impacts of planned actions on
surrounding civilian communities. Noise, air and water
polluting planned actions will be minimized and due con-
sideration given to all natural environmental factors,
operational safety and energy conservation."
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These objectives, goals and policies speak to the broad issues of shore
support for the operating forces, and to external output and internal
management of the various programs. While they do stress timeliness of
accomplishment, they do not address the succinct purpose of master
planning, nor do they refer to quality of the program output in terms of
benefits to the users. For these items, we must turn elsewhere.
The Navy's Shore Installations Planning and Programming System
(SFPPS) was initiated in 1960. The basic philosophy of the system was
stated in positive terms:
"The primary reason for a shore facility planning system is to
ensure that the effort and funds expended for shore facilities
are in proper balance with the support requirements generated
by the Operating Forces of the Navy. Accordingly, plans for
shore facilities must be based upon an austere approach to
satisfying firm operational requirements; they should not become
a means for the over-development of shore facilities to
satisfy the whims or desires of individuals. Planning in each
of its successive steps must adhere to reality and not encompass
Utopian goals that are financially unattainable. Such an
approach has an obvious advantage: considerable savings
should accrue from the reduction in expenditures of manhours
and paperwork which have in the past been required for plans
that had very little relation to true requirements and had no
chance of ever being funded. . .Planning must be a continuous
process and under frequent review if it is to produce the
maximum benefit with the minimum of effort. "^
As noted in Section 1 ,B., the directive did not make reference to master




A revision of the original planning directive, which appeared in
1962, added policies concerning personnel support facilities and criteria
for their design. The thrust of these items was the provision of an
improved physical environment for living and working which should be
efficient in function and economical in cost. The latest edition of this
directive, dated 1972, states: "It is essential that the facilities necessary
for the shore (field) activities to accomplish assigned missions be acquired
in a timely manner."
The first Navy directive addressed specifically to master planning
appeared in June 1968. It stated:
"In order for NAVFAC to produce master plans capable of
providing factual data and sound facilities planning
recommendations, it is essential that the plans and studies
be based on. . .(valid facilities requirements). Further, it
is necessary that this planning effort be monitored at critical
stages to ensure that it conforms with established guidance,
provides a basis for selection of alternative solutions, avoids
theoretical solutions impractical to implement, and reflects
competent and professional talent."
Master planning was defined as:
"The scientific art of comprehensive planning performed for an
activity or a complex of activities to assure the timely and
orderly physical development of facilities required to support
present and future military operations. This process blends
considerations of the total environment including physical
characteristics, operational necessities, human interests,
and areas of mutual concern beyond station boundaries."
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The master plan, upon approval, was defined as:
"The official planning document for the Naval activity
or complex of activities covered by the plan. It represents
in graphic, narrative and tabular form the present
composition of the activity and proposes the timely,
efficient and orderly physical development required to
perform its assigned mission and to meet its planned
operational workload.. .The Master Plan also provides
information useful in planning the operational expansion
of the activity beyond its present mission, up to its
maximum capability."'
Again, many good words, but no definite statement of purpose.
Subsequent revisions of the master planning directive, made in
March 1971 , and May 1974, did nothing to clarify the situation except
to reflect the increasing importance to planning of community and inter-
governmental relations. New requirements were added and procedures
altered, but the document remained basically a recipe telling "what it
is" and "how to do it".
The most recent evolution of the directive, dated December 1975, is
highly descriptive in terms of definitions and methodology; also, it adds
further requirements while stressing the need for flexibility in the approach
to individual situations. It defines planning as,
"The means of providing for the efficient and orderly
development of the real estate and facilities resources of
naval installations and shore activities." Continuing,
"The planning process is a multi-disciplinary effort and
gives full consideration to the total environment,
including physical characteristics, operational require-
ments and human concerns. The process is also sensitive
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and responsive to the goals and concerns of government on
the local, state and federal levels. Federal government
policies in areas such as the environment, energy and
regional planning are implemented through the master plan
program. "°
Perhaps the closest to a legitimate statement of purpose for master
planning is contained in a relatively early Navy directive, issued in
February 1968. Master planning, under the Shore Facilities Planning and
Programming System, was in its infancy and this directive actually pre-
dated the NAVFAC master planning instruction. It stated:
"(Master plans) will become the media for maintaining
continuity in future planning and development, thus
obviating problems associated with changes of Command
and individual preferences. Approved Master Plans will
be utilized for siting all future facilities to ensure maximum
economy of construction and operating efficiency and for
evaluating the capability of the activities to meet their
assigned missions and any contemplated changes thereto."
Discussion: The gist of the above statements appears to be that the
basic purpose of the Shore Facilities Planning and Programming System is
to support the timely acquisition of facilities needed by shore installations
to accomplish their assigned missions. It follows, then, that the basic
purpose of the master planning program is to achieve functionally efficient
and well ordered physical plans which are configured appropriately to the
installation mission and workload and are economical to acquire and
maintain. Secondary concerns are then: (1 ) the capability for orderly
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physical expansion to accommodate possible but unforeseen future
requirements; (2) compatibility with civilian regional and community
development policies and programs to avoid problems of encroachment
and a poor public image; (3) support for, or adherence to, relevant
federal policies and programs addressing the physical environment;
(4) addition of credibility to the Defense Department's Planning, Pro-
gramming, Budgeting System as it affects Naval shore facilities
acquisition and management; and, (5) enhancement of the installation's
physical environment, to increase internal morale and external
acceptance.
While these secondary concerns appear to reflect the intent of the
documents reviewed, they are not necessarily in order, nor are they all-
inclusive. Also, it appears that they are not wholly complementary, and
that trade-offs might be needed in the quest for their attainment.
The master planning survey solicited opinions on program goal
attainment through questionnaires which were submitted to three groups
as discussed in Part I.E., "Information Sources". These groups are
referred to as "Staff", "Consultants", and "Installations" in the following
analyses. Responses were aggregated to form a consensus for each group,
and are summarized in the following paragraphs.
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1 . There was general agreement that the master plan pro-
gram has been "reasonably" successful in meeting the
stated goals and objectives, recognizing that these are
normally given as "requirements" and "definitions" in
the official directives.
2. Areas of highest achievement were considered to be:
a. Projection of a good physical environment for
the installation which would enhance the public
image and bolster morale of assigned personnel;
b. Provision for attainment of order and efficiency
in facilities development and utilization;
c. Suitability of planned development to installa-
tion mission and workload accomplishment;
d. Provision of capability for expansion and/or
accommodation of future requirements.
3. Areas of marginal achievement were considered to be:
a. Response to social and economic concerns of the
civilian community regarding impacts of planned
operations and development;
b. Sensitivity to elements of the natural environment
regarding impacts of planned operations and
development;
c. Inter-governmental coordination regarding
planned operations and development, such as
sharing of policies and planning concepts with
other agencies or the civilian community.
63
Reasons given for marginal achievement in the areas
noted were; (1) a general lack of concern among
Navy planners and management officials, as all these
factors are basically "external" to the installation
and its headquarters, and (2) a general reluctance on
the part of Navy management officials to voluntarily
"get involved" in "external" matters, or to commit
their intentions to "outsiders" without a mandate.
4. Areas of lowest achievement were considered to be:
a. Timeliness of master plan input to the Shore
Facilities Planning and Programming System;
i.e., response to the ongoing facilities pro-
gramming and budgeting cycle;
b. Documentation to support the acquisition of
desired facilities;
c. Capacity for timely and systematic master plan
implementation.
Reasons given for lowest achievement in the areas
noted were: (1) the overly extended time period
consumed in the preparation of master plans; (2) the
tendency of Navy planners to accept given facility
requirements as sacrosanct, requiring no further
justification; (3) insufficient attention given to
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project phasing and priorities for implementation;
(4) loss of planning continuity through rotation of
Navy management personnel; (5) unforeseen changes
in installation mission, workload and organizational
structure, and in policies and priorities at the
departmental or headquarters levels; and, (6) lack
of commitment to the value of the master plan at all
levels of concern.
The installations also cited a preoccupation of Navy
planners with long range, idealized planning concepts
as a problem source. In essence, advocacy for
unsupported projects, at the expense of established
and immediate requirements, casts a shadow on the
credibility of the entire plan.
5. There was general agreement among the groups sur-
veyed that the program has best met the stated goals
when the master plan has been viewed as a general
guide to development, rather than a detailed mandate.
This approach appears to conflict with the desires of
the installations, however, which stress project
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definition and phasing. All groups agreed on the need
for more sensitive consideration of environmental factors,
closer inter-governmental coordination in planning and
development, and a higher regard for socio-economic
impacts of the Navy on the surrounding civilian community.
The record to date, however, was conceded to be mediocre
in all of these areas. Suggestions for improvement focused
on the need for more frequent and open interaction on
both formal and informal bases, and the involvement of
both management and staff personnel, according to the
level or status of the issues concerned.
6. Another factor that emerged through the survey is
that master planning is a multi-purpose function, having
a substantially different purpose for each of four
distinct user groups: (a) Installations, for day-to-day
decision making on physical plant management and
interface with the civilian community on matters of
mutual concern; (b) NAVFAC Engineering Field
Divisions, for project siting review and certification;
(c) Installation headquarters, for facilities programming
and budgeting; and, (d) NAVFAC Headquarters, for
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interface with Navy Department, Defense Department
and Congressional representatives on matters of shore
installation development.
7. There was consensus that the master plan program is
of relative value, in descending order, to the installa-
tions, NAVFAC Headquarters and Engineering Field
Divisions, installation headquarters, and other
Washington level agencies and departments.
8. The master planning program was judged to accommo-
date the full spectrum of installation operational and
environmental characteristics "quite well" ("1 .5"
average on a "1 " to "5" basis); changes in
Congressional and departmental level policy
"moderately well" ("1 .7" average); and, changes in
installation mission, workload or organization only
"marginally well" ("2.6" average). Suggestions for
improvement included keeping the master plan
"flexible", soliciting better planning guidance from
headquarters and departmental levels, and achieving
better "in-house" (NAVFAC) coordination regarding
master plan purpose and use.
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Conclusions: The overall sentiment of the master plan survey is that
the Navy's master plan program has neither fully succeeded nor utterly
failed in goal attainment, but that its level of achievement lies somewhere
within the mid-spectrum. This is completely understandable and could
have been predicted on the basis of evaluation used, which took a con-
sensus of 18 separate responses. Substantial deviations from the norm were
not uncommon on an individual basis, however, and these have been
considered for their motive and value.
Navy staff are concerned mainly with master plan process and pro-
ductivity, and lean more toward quality and quantity where a choice
must be made. Consultants are oriented toward the specific master plan
program and product; i.e., the scope of work, which sets the ground rules
for their performance, and the end-item document, which is what they're
being paid to produce. Installations, on the other hand, are strongly
implementation and project oriented, having little quibble with program
goals, objectives and policies, process or product; so long as the master
plan is rationally conceived, maintained current, and capable of stimulating
appropriations.
The basic planning objectives, goals and policies of the Navy
Department and NAVFAC are very general as stated, and do not provide a
good basis for program evaluation, in either qualitative or quantitative
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terms. Furthermore, a clear statement of purpose for master planning of
Naval shore installations is not explicitly stated in any of the official
directives. I share the conclusion that, "The most clear-cut evidence of
the primitive state of federal self-evaluation lies in the widespread failure
of agencies even to spell out program objectives. . .there is no standard
against which to measure whether the direction of a program or its rate of
progress is satisfactory." Another source adds, "Failure to achieve
stated program objectives may not always reflect unfavorably on the use-
fulness of the program. But such failure imposes substantial requirements
for information about the conduct of the program, and raises questions
about the assumptions made in planning for it."
1 . On the basis of master plan survey responses, the following are
concluded with regard to stated goals, objectives and policies
as they apply to master planning, and to "definitions" and
"requirements" contained in the master planning instructions:
a. The master planning program has, in practice, advanced
some "idealized" planning concepts which are not
supportable on the basis of known or firmly projected
facilities requirements. This is in possible conflict with
the basic NAVFAC Command objective, "to ensure that
the shore facilities and fixed ocean facilities necessary to
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support the Navy are available at the best balance
between requirement and economy." This situation under-
scores a dilemma in that, while a mid-range (5-8 year)
planning approach is specified, the master plan program
seems to be an appropriate tool for long-range forecasting
in search of an improved physical plant configuration for
shore installations. This is to say, mid-range planning
based on firm requirements inhibits the possibility of inno-
vation. While inclusion of "pie-in-the-sky" projects has not
been made to the exclusion of established facility require-
ments, their presence may have placed the credibility of the
entire plan in question. The requirement for investigation
of potentialities does appear in the NAVFAC master plan
directive; perhaps it should also appear in the basic
Command objectives. A DELPHI survey conducted by
NAVFAC in 1972 raised the question of planning beyond
the mid-range period. The response (22 positive; 6
12
negative) was strongly in favor of long-range planning.
A Navy planning consultant has said, "It is absolute folly
to base military installation planning entirely upon current
missions.
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b. The Command policy stating, "Planning for the provision of
shore installations and facilities will be accomplished in time
to provide a basis for orderly programming and budgeting",
has not been complied with to the extent originally antici-
pated. This issue is discussed in Section C, "Program
Output".
c. The Command policy stating, "Shore installations and facil-
ities planning will be performed 'in-house 1 to the maximum
extent practicable", has generally been complied with,
although greater reliance on contract preparation would
tend to increase master plan output. This issue is also
discussed under "Program Output".
d. The Command policy stating, "Planning studies will be
sensitive to environmental and community-oriented
constraints, with consideration given to the social and
economic impacts of planned actions on surrounding
civilian communities", has been complied with in letter,
if not in spirit. While the degree of desired compliance is
not clear, there was general agreement among the groups
interviewed that what has been done is less than ultimately
desirable. It has more likely been the mandatory minimum.
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e. The master plan program has been generally successful in
providing a suitable physical environment for Naval
installations to accomplish their assigned missions and
workload, and in supporting the environmental policies and
programs of other federal agencies.
f. The program has been somewhat less successful in providing
for accommodation of unanticipated changes to installation
mission and workload, and in lending support for acquisition
of high priority facilities projects. These failures can be
rationalized on the ground that: (1) there is no feasible way
to provide for all possible alternative futures in the master
plan process—this can only be accomplished through plan
revision at the time in which changes occur; and (2) there
is no bonus given for possession of a master plan in terms of
project acquisition—the plan can only hope to establish
meaningful priorities for incremental development. These
are, of course, good arguments against the case for "long-
range" master plans which speak in generalities, suggesting
consideration of shorter-range plans with more specific
emphasis on project acquisition.
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g. The survey consensus that no substantive changes to the
master planning goals and objectives are necessary, is
surprising and disappointing. I believe that the Navy's
master plan directive should include a conspicuous statement
on the purpose of the program in addition to its definition
and procedures for accomplishment. The purpose should be
defined, both in terms of general benefits to the Navy and
the Department of Defense, and of specific benefits to the
installation and its environment. Such a statement would be
of fundamental interest, both to all prospective commands
for which a master planning effort is targeted, and to head-
quarters level offices who must often pay for the services.
Furthermore, it would establish a common point of reference
for all "in-house" discussions of "process" and "product",
addressing the multi-purpose nature of the master plan.
Personal experience, augmented by discussions with other
Navy planners, confirms that a ten-year dialogue on the




Objective and Criteria ; Determine the relevance of official master
planning procedures and documentation to the fulfillment of stated program
objectives, goals and policies.
The evaluation is based on review of historical and current Navy
master planning directives and responses to the master planning survey
conducted for this paper.
Background: The Navy master planning directive describes a pre-
cise methodology for accomplishment of master plans. The major
elements of procedure are; preparation of a scope of work, pre-planning
conference (at the installation), data collection, (field investigation of the
installation physical plant and discussions with key departmental personnel),
planning analysis and concept development, coordination and review
(local and headquarters level), publication, submittal, approval and
updating.
The directive also prescribes a model for format and contents of the
master plan document. Format items include an executive summary,
introduction, area factors (regional and vicinal considerations), installa-
tion description (existing conditions, mission and tasks, base loading,
organization structure, functional inter-relationships, etc.), planning
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analysis and development concepts, and recommendations, with
appendices. The current instruction also requires an environmental
impact assessment, an energy conservation plan, and a capital improve-
ment plan, as supplemental elements. Contents items include various
maps and plans, augmented by charts, graphs, tables, diagrams and
photographs as necessary to describe the situation and proposals.
Discussion: Considerations of procedures and documentation are
treated separately and are based on findings of the master planning survey,
1 . Results of the survey indicated general agreement among
participants that the master planning procedures outlined in
the directive are "moderately" relevant to satisfaction of
the stated goals, objectives and policies of the program ("2.1 "
average on a "1 " to "5" basis).
The NAVFAC Engineering Field Divisions believe that the
methodology is too extensive and that portions are irrelevant
to the desired product; NAVFAC Headquarters and the
Consultants believe the methodology is satisfactory as stated.
Staff considers both field investigation,and planning analysis
and concept development, to be the elements of the methodology
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most sensitive to master plan quality. Consultants believe the
scope of work, including program requirements, is the most
sensitive element. This is predictable, considering their
contractual relationship to the program.
There was general agreement that coordination and review
is the most troublesome element of the methodology, and
Consultants also cite data collection as a problem area.
Coordination and review is accomplished at several levels and
at several stages in master plan development, with each iteration
requiring a different approach in the presentation method.
Experience has shown this to be a costly, time-consuming, and
often frustrating process. The same can be said for data
collection, as available information is often incomplete and
out-of-date, requiring additional field work and communication.
Although not surveyed on methodology, the Installation responses
suggest a need for more reliance on quantitative data regarding
facilities requirements and assets.
There was a definite indication that more flexibility is
needed in master planning procedures, permitting interpretive
judgment to suit individual circumstances.
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2. Results of the survey indicated general agreement that the pre-
scribed format and contents are "moderately" relevant to
satisfaction of the stated goals, objectives and policies of the
master planning program ("2.1" average on a "1 " to "5" basis).
Staff and Installations consider that planning analysis and
development concepts are the elements of documentation most
important to master plan quality and usefulness. Consultants
believe the executive summary to be the most important, as it
is often all that's read by management.
There was general agreement that area factors are the least
important element of the documentation, as they are often
irrelevant to the master plan objectives. If retained, this
element should be reduced in scope and related explicitly to
master plan considerations. Staff also cited installation
description, and Consultants, introduction, as relatively
unimportant, as they are somewhat redundant and subject to
early obsolescence.
Installations would like to see the approved Basic Facilities
Requirements List included in the documentation, together with
a project priority and phasing schedule. Also, the Installations
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noted that the master plan document has not proven to be very
useful in preparation of project submittals, day-to-day manage-
ment of the physical plant, and facilitation of community inter-
face.
Conclusions: Based on the findings of the master planning survey, the
following are concluded for program directives related to procedures and
documentation:
1 . The methodology prescribed for master plan preparation is generally
satisfactory, but could be more generalized and condensed. The
historical tendency has been toward preoocupation with detailed
procedure, which inhibits flexibility in its application. Once
the purpose and final configuration of the plan are known, the
procedures necessary to reach these ends should be a matter of
formative professional judgment.
The tendency to detailed procedure has not diminished;
the most recent master planning directive runs for 44 pages -
the original directive only 24. Allowing for changes in format
and discounting dissimilar material, the current instruction
requires 31 pages to describe what its predecessor said in 12
pages. It can be argued in truth that planning issues have
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grown more complex, and that the procession of mandatory
planning requirements is hardly diminishing. But it appears that
the master plan program may be trying to do too much; perhaps,
more than it needs to. The audible complaint that master plans
take too long to prepare is scarcely appeased by the addition of
supplemental requirements. It seems a characteristic of
bureaucracies to meet pressure for reform by adding layers of
responsibility to existing requisites. If Command policies for
responsiveness are laid against the new instruction, the Navy's
master planning program may be in danger of serious over-
commitment.
2. The documentation prescribed for master plans is generally
satisfactory in terms of its relevance to program goals and
objectives. The finding that installations apparently derive
little operative value from their master plans, however, is dis-
appointing; it suggests that either the document format be
modified, or the proposed statement of purpose be limited to
known productive uses. The current directive appears to opt
for the former, as it has added several mandatory plan elements,
including an "Energy Conservation Plan" and a "Capital
Improvement Plan". These will doubtless be welcomed by both
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the installations and headquarters level commands. As noted
earlier, however, they will certainly frustrate efforts to produce
master plans in a "timely manner". Furthermore, their ultimate
value will depend on their accuracy and completeness, requiring
possible trade-offs in other areas of planning responsibility.
3. There is little discussion of quality in the master plan directives.
The fundamental difference between General Development Maps
(which preceded master plans and are still in use to portray
existing and planned facilities development) and master plans,
is that the maps can only describe proposed development in terms
of "what, where" and "how much"; master plans also state "why,
when" and "how". These are the qualitative elements which are
unique to master plans and are deserving of conspicuous mention
in the basic planning instruction.
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C. PROGRAM OUTPUT
Objective and Criteria: Determine the extent to which master plan
output has met the assigned goals and targets of the program, considering
both initial preparation and periodic updating of plans.
The evaluation is based on master plan accomplishment schedules,
goals and policies for updating, and records of current and targeted
achievements, all received from NAVFAC Headquarters.
Background: The original Navy master planning directive, of June
1968, listed 137 major Naval and Marine Corps installations and complexes
for which master plans were required. Seventeen of these plans had
already been prepared, leaving a balance of 120 plans to be accomplished
in a stated five-year time frame. The enclosed schedule, however, called
for this work to be performed between fiscal years (FY) 1969 and 1975,
inclusive; therefore, a seven-year time frame is used for purposes of
evaluation.
A subsequent revision of the original directive, dated March 1971
,
stated a requirement to update master plans on a three-year cycle,
"resources permitting".
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Within the seven-year planning period, 20 additional master plans
were assigned, but the original schedule was not adjusted to accommodate
the increased requirements. NAVFAC Command policies and goals re-
garding master plan preparation and updating are stated in Section II . A.,
"Program Objectives", and are used for evaluation of the program output
discussed in this section.
Current Status : As of 1 July 1975 (the end of FY 1975), the NAVFAC
Master Plan Status Report gave the following information:
Master Plans completed ...... 65* (22 by contract)
Master Plans underway 32 ( 6 by contract)
Master Plans remaining 43
*excludes the 17 plans completed prior to FY 1969
In addition to these master plans, two "Air Installations Compatible
Use Zone" (AICUZ) plans were completed in 1975. Thirty-two AICUZ
plans were underway, and 47 were remaining, with program completion
targeted in 1979. AICUZ plans are a recent requirement and a separate
planning program. They are comparable to master plans in scope and
complexity and are the responsibility of the NAVFAC master planning
branches. Although they are prepared by planning service contract, they
are a time-consuming responsibility which was not anticipated at the outset
of the master plan program.
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The Master Plan Status Report shows further that 15 master plan up-
dates were completed through FY 1975 and 25 updates were underway.
The total number of master plans requiring updating as of that date,
according to a three-year cycle (i.e., plans completed through FY 1972),
was 56.
Discussion: Of the 55 initially-targeted master plans completed
through FY 1975:
45 were completed later than scheduled ( 1 to 6 years )
8 were completed earlier than scheduled ( 1 to 3 years )
2 were completed on schedule
The average completion date was 2.01 years later than scheduled.
Of the 15 master plan updates accomplished, only two were started
within three years after the plan was completed. The interval ranged
from 2 to 13 years, with the average interval being 5.26 years.
Two assumptions are made in order to allocate performance credit in
the evaluation:
1 • Master plan preparation or updating underway is given
50 percent value of a completed effort;
— 83 —
2. Master plan updates completed within three years of initial
preparation represent 50 percent of the effort required for
initial preparation; updates completed within four years
represent 75 percent of the effort; and, updates completed
within five years or more represent 100 percent of the effort.
Completion of 55 master plans between FY 1969 and FY 1975, of 120
plans initially assigned, is only 45.8 percent of the total. Adding credit
for master plans underway, (23 x 0.50), gives an equivalent completion
total of 55.4 percent; adding credit for the additionally assigned master
plans completed, (10x1 .00), and underway, (9 x 0.50), gives an
equivalent completion total of 67.5 percent; a somewhat more respectable
accomplishment. Figure 6 shows relative values of targets and accomplish-
ments for master plan preparation. The average rate of completion as
visualized in the directive is 17.1 master plans per year; the actual rate
has been 11 .6 plans per year, allowing for work underway. At this rate,
the remainder of 75 assigned master plans will require 5.09 years to
complete, and so will terminate that aspect of the program late in 1980.
Completion of 15 master plan updates between FY 1969 and FY 1975,
out of 56 master plans eligible on a three-year cycle, is only 26.8 percent
of the target. Adding credit for updates underway, (25 x 0.50), gives
an equivalent update total of 27.5 plans, or 49.1 percent of the target.
This record still leaves much to be desired.
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The original master planning directive did not specifically address
updating and may be assumed to have considered only original preparation.
If all resources expended in master plan updating could have been applied
to initial plan preparation, the output would have been more impressive.
Using the criteria assumed for master plan updating, expressed as a percent-
age of initial preparation effort, updating work to date would translate into
the equivalent of 25.5 additional master plan completions. The total
completion equivalent would then be 106.5 master plans, or 88.0 percent
of the original target. Figure 7 shows relative values of targets and
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Whatever the intent of the original master plan directive, regular
updating is a practical necessity and cannot be ignored in the evaluation.
A DELPHI study was conducted by NAVFAC Headquarters in 1972 to
15
obtain a concensus on certain features of the master planning process.
The study originated out of concern over the growing master plan workload
which had to be accomplished with limited and/or diminishing resources.
One conclusion of the study was that regular updating is essential to the
usefulness of master plans, and that the interval should not exceed three
years.
Figures 8, 9 and 10 chart the targeted and actual master plan
accomplishments for preparation and updating, respectively, from FY 1969
through FY 1975, and project the schedules and accomplishments through
completion of the respective cycles.
Figure 8 shows the chronological backlog of: (1) original master plan
preparation targets, as established by the initial directive; (2) "revised"
targets, adjusted to reflect the addition of 20 new master plans to the
total requirements; and, (3) actual "net" accomplishment as an incremental
reduction of the backlog, considering both initial targets and new master
plan requirements at the time of their introduction. Figure 9 shows similar
information, but in reverse progression; that is, actual targets and
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FIGURE 8: MASTER PLAN PREPARATION BACKLOG
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FIGURE 9: MASTER PLAN PREPARATION PROGRESS
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It can be seen from these charts that:
1 . A wide disparity between targets and accomplishments was
generated in the first year of the program and has not been
closed in subsequent years;
2. The actual rate of master plan accomplishment has been
reasonably uniform, therefore, the 32 master plans shown
as underway in FY 1976 will probably not be completed
before FY 1979;
3. Based on the average rate of master plan accomplishments
(9.3 plans per year), and if no more new plans are assigned,
the present backlog of 75 master plans can be completed by
the end of FY 1983.
Figure 1 shows the chronological sequence of: (1) master plan up-
dating targets, based on a three-year cycle and the preparation schedule
contained in the initial directive; (2) "revised" updating targets, based
on a three-year cycle and adjusted to reflect the addition of 20 new
master plans to the total requirement at the time of their introduction;
(3) "corrected" updating targets, based on a three-year cycle and adjusted
to reflect the actual rate of accomplishment, for both initially assigned
and additional requirements; and, (4) the actual master plan updating
accomplishments—an average of 3.75 plans per year.
— 88 —
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FIGURE 10: MASTER PLAN UPDATING SEQUENCE
It can be seen from this chart that:
Master plan updating targets, based on a three-year cycle
for initially assigned and additional requirements, have
extremely wide annual fluxuation, varying from 25 to 85
updates per year. A constant three-year cycle would begin
in FY 1976;
Updating targets, based on a three-year cycle for actual
master plan accomplishments, would have less annual
fluxuation, varying from 18 to 58 updates per year beyond
FY 1975. A constant three-year cycle would begin in FY
1984;
The average actual accomplishment to date is 3.75 updates
per year, far below the desired rate. If this rate is main-
tained until FY 1984 (at which time all assigned master plans
would be completed at the present preparation rate), the back-
log of targeted master plan update actions will be 31 1 .4 !
This is an impressive deficit, but hardly fair, since
unaccomplishment targets have been compounded on a tri-
annual basis. The actual backlog at that time, in terms of
delinquent updates, would be 84. This is still a lot of work.
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Theoretically, all planning effort beyond FY 1983 can be directed
toward updating, as all scheduled master plans will have been completed.
Assuming that an update accomplished on a three-year basis represents
half of the effort required for initial preparation, updates can proceed at
the rate of 22.35 per year (twice the average historical preparation rate
of 9.3 plans per year, plus the current update rate of 3.75 plans per year),
The demand, however, will be for 52.3 updates per year, as can be seen
on Figure 10. Therefore, it will be impossible to meet the stated objective
under the given criteria.
One alternative is to use a five-year update interval. Under this
approach the required number of annual updates, upon reaching cycle
equilibrium in FY 1984, would range from 27.7 to 41.7. This range is
still beyond the theoretical capability of the program under the present
arrangement. Furthermore, updating on a five-year cycle would require
much more effort per unit that a three-year cycle
—
perhaps twice as
much—as has been assumed. The theoretical capability for updating on
a five-year cycle would be only 13.05 master plans per year.
It seems reasonable to assume that not all master plans will require
updating every three years; many could be extended to five years or more,
and few would become obsolete in less than three years. Furthermore,
updates accomplished by planning service contract require less "in-house"
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effort than those accomplished wholly "in-house". Only one of the 15 up-
dates completed through FY 1975 was made by contract. If "in-house"
planning resources utilized in planning service contract administration can
result in two or three times the master planning productivity than when
used wholly "in-house", it appears that the requirement for master plan
updating on a three year interval can be satisfied in this manner.
Records of manhour expenditures at Western Division, NAVFAC,
indicate "in-house" administration effort for planning service contracts
to be approximately 17 percent of the effort required for exclusively
"in-house" accomplishment. A trend toward increased use of planning
service contracts for updating is already apparent; eight of the 25 updates
now "underway" are being done in this manner.
Conclusions:
1 . The output of the master planning program has not met its stated
goals and targets in terms of initial plan preparation. The
DELPHI study conducted by NAVFAC in 1972 showed unanimous
agreement among participants that master plan output was
inadequate, and that means to higher productivity must be found.
The master planning survey conducted for this paper conceded
that output has been only "fair", receiving a value of "2.4" on
a "1 " to "5" basis; "1 " being the highest. Another source of
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opinion was found in a "Market Survey" conducted by NAVFAC
in early 1975. The Survey assessed the performance of all
NAVFAC functions through the eyes of staff civil engineers or
public works officers at the installations served. On a rating
scale of "l-to-9", master planning was given a "potential
value" of "7.3" and a "performance value" of "5.9". This
placed master planning 12th out of 14 functions conducted within
the NAVFAC planning departments. The average "performance
value" for aH NAVFAC functions was "6.3".
It is assumed that NAVFAC planning resources have been
allocated on the basis of "in-house" accomplishment of the
initially targeted master plans, through full-time effort of the
assigned personnel. Had this situation been realized, it seems
probable that the targets would have been met. The master
planning survey indicated that only about 50 percent of the master
planning teams' time is spent on "in-house" master plan prepara-
tion. If this figure were 100 percent, and a corresponding output
rate maintained, 135 master plans could have been prepared
through FY 1975 and the target would very nearly have been met.
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.?. Addition of new master planning requirements (including
AICUZ plans) has inhibited accomplishment of the initially
assigned plans, and diversion of master planning personnel to
other, non-targeted planning studies has reduced master plan
output substantially. The master planning survey indicated the
major deterrants to output were, in order: (a) interruptions due
to "brush fires" and other priority, non-targeted workload;
(b) inadequate personnel resources; and, (c) extensive periods
for master plan presentation and review. It appears that the
first obstacle could be reduced by change in local management
policies or in distribution of personnel resources; the second, by
using more contract planning services to augment "in-house"
capabilities; and, the third, by revision of basic planning
procedures and requirements. These issues are discussed at
length in Section II. F., "Program Management".
3. Higher master plan productivity appears necessary, particularly
in the updating process, if the program is to be responsive to
the stated NAVFAC Command policy of timeliness. . ."to provide
1
8
a basis for orderly programming and budgeting." Military
construction programming and budgeting are continuous
functions which are reviewed annually for Congressional
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appropriation. A master plan that is out of date (let alone,
non-existent) cannot provide the decision making guidance
needed and is, consequently, of little or no value. The
majority of master plans are sufficiently out of date within three
years to reduce their optimum value; further delays not only
compound the loss of value, but entail a larger planning effort
in the updating process.
4. Master plan updating has met neither the stated goals and targets
of the program, nor the NAVFAC performance goal to "reduce the
19
backlog of master plans over five years old to 20% of total".
The backlog of master plans over five years old was 22 in July
1975—33.8 percent of the total number of plans completed. The
problem is one of priorities. Master plan updating has been
subordinated to initial plan preparation, with needed updates
being routinely deferred. As the initial preparation cycle
approaches finality, increasingly more resources can be allocated
to updating; but "in-house" capabilities will never be adequate
to fully meet the demand. More reliance on planning service
contracts is the most obvious solution, but it has some problems:
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a. It is counter to stated NAVFAC policy, which favors
"in-house" planning, ". . .to the maximum extent practi-
cable. "^O This policy is also consistent with opinions
rendered in the master planning survey, which indicated
a unanimous preference for "in-house" accomplishment.
Contract planning services are considered to be of some-
what lower quality than "in-house" efforts;
b. It would require additional funding. To maintain required
updates at three-year intervals, and utilizing "in-house"
resources to capacity, contract planning services would be
required for an average of 34 updates per year through FY
1983, and for 30 updates per year thereafter; the balance
being performed "in-house" in each case.
5. The NAVFAC support goal to "limit effort devoted to untargeted
21
planning studies to 15% of effort", has apparently been met
—
but barely. The master planning survey indicated this effort to
be 14 percent of the aggregate Master Planning Branch workload
in FY 1975.
6. Master plans take too long to prepare. A sampling of 15 master
plans completed by Western Division, NAVFAC, between July
1965 and December 1974, took an average of 21 .8 months to
complete, and an additional 3.9 months to publish; a total of
25.7 months with a range between 12 and 46 months. Extended
delays in preparation time were due, in some cases, to temporary
suspension of effort in favor of other priority work. The primary
cause of delay, however, was extended periods of review, which
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are conducted at local, field and headquarters levels, and at
various stages of plan preparation. A sampling of 12 master
plans prepared by contract for Western Division, NAVFAC,
between February 1968 and the present, expended an average
of 22.4 weeks for reviews at all levels, with a range between
11 and 39 weeks.
Responses to the master planning survey indicated an
"optimum" preparation time for a master plan of "typical"
complexity of 9 to 12 months, including an allowance of
approximately nine weeks for reviews. There is obviously a
wide disparity between "what ought to be" and "what is",
in terms of master plan productivity. This is a common
situation and is understandable. It is noted, however, that
actual master plan completion dates have exceeded those




Objective and Criteria: Estimate the total cost of the Navy's master
planning program to the present, and to the completion date of all initial
preparation efforts. Relate program cost to program output and determine
whether the Navy is getting its "money's worth".
The evaluation is based on a historical record of monetary allocations
and actual expenditures for master planning, both locally and Navy-wide.
Background: The Navy's master planning program, unlike the more
familiar federal programs, is not a dedicated, single-purpose, limited
duration activity with a fixed appropriation. Therefore, costs and outputs
can be measured and compared, but not correlated in terms of goal
22
attainment. According to Dror, the primary criterion of net output is
usually hard to identify, let alone to measure, in a social process such as
master planning. Where an output of professional service is related to
dollar input, even secondary criteria are elusive, and the best that can be
hoped for is a better guess as to whether the money is being wisely spent.
23
According to data furnished by NAVFAC Headquarters, the Navy
spent approximately $10,527,000 on the master planning program between
FY 1969 and FY 1975, inclusively. This is the estimated total cost for
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preparation and updating of master plans and regional complex plans,
including planning service contract fees and associated "in-house"
administrative costs. It is based on direct labor and overhead for all
professional, administrative and technical support services required for
program accomplishment, including travel and printing costs.
The figure is approximate as the method of accounting has varied
from year to year, and consistent data is not available for all years con-
sidered. As example, costs for FY 1971 and 1972 are based on fund
allocations rather than actual expenditures, and costs for FY 1969 and
1970 have been estimated, as no data is available for this period. The
estimate uses a straight line projection from the mean of FY 1971-1975,
but discounted to allow for 5.50 percent average annual inflation.
No credit has been given for master plans "underway" at the end of
FY 1975, since some number of plans were also "underway" at the
beginning of FY 1969. This is assumed to constitute a balance for
evaluative purposes.
Discussion: Figure 11 shows annual master planning allocations and
expenditures on both incremental and cumulative bases, for the FY 1969-
1975 time frame. Figure 12 shows "adjusted" allocations and expenditures
as compared to master plan output, on both incremental and cumulative
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FIGURE 12: MASTER PLANNING COSTS VERSUS OUTPUT
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neutralize the impact of inflation on incremental funding, assuming an
average cost growth rate of 5.50 percent per year, compounded. Master
plan output includes both initial preparation and updating, a total of 80
units. These have been correlated with total expenditures on the basis of
uniform cost per unit. It has been assumed, for this purpose, that a
master plan update is equivalent to initial preparation, and that all units
of output are equal in effort and cost.
Figure 11 shows that allocations have exceeded expenditures since
FY 1972 and that, prior to that time, expenditures may have exceeded
allocations. This reflects a probable shift in priorities from earlier
emphasis on assigned program targets to later emphasis on associated
planning support services. In essence, a portion of the funds allocated to
targeted master planning tasks were diverted to non-targeted efforts
which, apparently, were given priority. This assumption is reinforced by
the responses to the master planning survey conducted for this paper,
which confirmed a recent and growing trend in this direction.
Figure 12 shows that the rate of master plan output has generally
been lower than that for corresponding expenditures, based on equivalence
at the initial and terminal positions. Both output and expenditures have
varied significantly from year to year, but have been mutually compen-
sating.
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In all, preparation and updating of 80 master plans have cost
approximately $10,527,000, or an average of $131,600 per unit.
Translated into FY 1975 dollars, this is an equivalent expenditure of
$12,504,000, or $156,300 per unit. The portion of this total attributable
to initial preparation (65 units) is $10,159,000. Therefore, the estimated
cost in FY 1975 dollars for completion of the 75 remaining master plans is
$9,222,000, (32 plans "underway" x 0.50 + 43 plans remaining x 1 .00,
at $156,300 per unit). At completion of the master plan preparation cycle,
then, the program will have cost approximately $19,380,000 in FY 1975
dollars, exclusive of future updating expenses.
Comparative costs for "in-house" versus contract accomplishment are
not readily available. To obtain an approximation, a survey was made of
24 master plans prepared or updated by contract between FY 1971 and 1975.
The 24 plans had an aggregate cost of $1 ,873,000, or an average of
$78,000 per unit. To this must be added the "in-house" costs for contract
administration and printing, which averaged $13,500 and $6,000 per unit,
respectively. Thus, if a contract master plan cost averages $97,500 per
unit, the 15 units accomplished in this manner cost $1 ,463,000; it then
follows that the 65 "in-house" units cost $9,044,000, or an average of
$139,300 per unit.
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Conclusions: "In-house" master planning has cost perhaps 40 percent
more than equivalent work by planning service contract. Direct labor costs
for private firms are assumed to be equivalent to those for NAVFAC staff.
Therefore, considering that private firms characteristically have overhead
factors in the range of 100 percent (versus about 30 percent for NAVFAC),
and are also paid profits in the range of 15 percent of direct costs plus
overhead, it is obvious that substantially more time is spent on "in-house"
accomplishment than on contract work.
It can be argued that the more ambitious, thus time-consuming,
projects are normally done "in-house". This appears to be true; never-
theless, the conclusion is inescapable that, while "in-house" accomplish-
ment is preferable in terms of end-item quality, contract performance is
more "efficient" in terms of product yield per dollar expenditure. It is
probable that private firms under planning service contracts maintain a
higher sense of urgency for accomplishment than do Navy staff planners
on permanent salary status. Furthermore, private firms are undoubtably
less subject to distractions and interruptions than are Navy planners, who
must respond to many calls. It is almost certain, though unproven, that
frequent interruption causes delays through redundancy, which are
additive to "actual" time lost through the interruption itself. Responses
to the master planning survey indicated frequent interruption to be,
increasingly, a "way of life" for Navy planners.
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The questions remaining, then, are; (1 ) is the Navy getting its
"money's worth" from the master planning program,and (2) should "in-
house" accomplishment be maintained as the preferable option over
planning service contracts? Stated in more explicit terms, as provided
by this research; (1) is $139,300 a "fair" price to pay for a "typical"
"in-house" master plan, or $97,500 for a "typical" contract plan, and
(2) is the superior quality of an "in-house" plan worth an average of $41 ,800
more than a contract plan.
The questions are somewhat inter-related, but neither can be
answered with finality. Considering absolute costs, it can only be con-
cluded that the maximum probable cost of an installation master plan is
less than the minimum probable acquisition cost of any of the proposed
facilities projects which it addresses. For example, a master plan costing
$100,000 may recommend construction of 20 projects estimated to cost
$10,000,000. If one percent of this estimated construction cost can be
avoided through application of master plan guidance, then the plan has
paid for itself in dollars. One private planning contractor estimated, in
1958, that accrued savings of three to five million dollars could be
attributed directly to the availability of master plans for two Naval
installations in the Pacific area. A time-saving of several months,
perhaps a year, was also attributed to the presence of a master plan for
24
incremental facilities development at these locations.
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A more negative view is expressed by another executive:
"I do not believe that one can usefully come up with
dollar earnings or dollar savings attributable to the
long-range planning function. This is because usually
the function is a necessity to the conduct of a business
which survives, and the real question is whether it is
formally recognized as a separate and distinct function
or one which is joined with other functions and does
not get clearly demarcated."^
Long-range planning certainly gets clearly demarcated in the Navy,
but the monetary benefits, if any, are elusive. It cannot be assumed that
a savings of $10,527,000 to date would have resulted from having not
conducted the master planning program. The master plan staff performs a
variety of ancillary planning services which, in the absence of the
program, would have required additional staffing. These services include
collection and distribution of planning data, facility siting review, con-
sultation, and graphic support. It is difficult to estimate the value of
these services independently, but they could reasonably equal up to
25 percent of the total program cost, or $2,632,000.
"In-house" planning does have a number of spin-off benefits which,
when added to the greater value of the completed master plans, suggest
the NAVFAC Command policy of favoring "in-house" accomplishment be
maintained. For example, a wealth of peripheral knowledge is
accumulated during the master planning process, which can be of con-
siderable value in subsequent applications. Under contract accomplishment,
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this knowledge is gained by the consultant, but is all but inaccessible
to the Navy. Furthermore, it is probable that the more direct personal
involvement of "in-house" service conveys a higher sense of responsibility
and competence to the plan beneficiaries, thus adding insurance to the
likelihood of the plan staying "on track".
— 105 —
E. PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS
Objective and Criteria : Determine the performance level of the
Navy's master planning program in terms of its effectiveness in:
(1) guiding subsequent physical development consistent with master plan
recommendations; (2) producing an improved physical environment
consistent with specific beneficiary needs; and, (3) satisfying additional
requirements of the Naval establishment and the civilian community.
The evaluation is based on questionnaire responses from the master
planning survey, recommendations of selected installation master plans,
and data on in-place and programmed construction at these and other
26
military installations.
Procedure: The analysis is focused on two separate considerations
of program effectiveness. The first portion is addressed to master plan
implementation; it examines the integrity of the master plan process in
affectuating recommended development in quantitative terms, considered
as a "batting average". Melville Branch calls implementation, "...the
27
vital essence of real planning and the most difficult part of the process."
While he was referring to planning in the metropolitan sector, the process
is equally important in the military. If less complicated, it is still marked
by uncertainty and compromise.
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Within the purview of NAVFAC responsibilities, master plans are
implemented through the processes of construction programming, facilities
site review and certification, General Development Map administration,
and continuous liaison with the various installations and their chains-of-
command. None of this guarantees early funding of priority projects,
but it all attempts to keep incremental facilities development "on track"
with the intent of the master plans.
Both conventional benefit-cost analysis and controlled experimen-
tation were inappropriate to the nature of this research, due to
28
limitations of time and data. "Time-trend" projections were likewise
inapplicable for similar reasons, and also because the results would be
29
highly inconclusive. The evaluative methods used, then, were
limited to adaptations of "before versus after" comparison, "semi-
30
controlled experimentation, and "planned versus actual" comparison.
Of 41 West Coast candidates, ten Naval installations - representing
a good cross-section of size and mission characteristics - were selected
for comparison. Five of these installations had master plans which were
completed in the 1969-1971 time frame and thus have had at least five
years' experience in their use. The other five installations did not have
master plans completed as of 1 July 1975 and thus have developed to the
present in "unplanned" fashion.
— 107
For installations with master plans, the evaluation sought answers
to the following questions:
1 . What were the conditions existing just prior to the inception
of the master plan process, in terms of recognized facilities
requirements or deficiencies and planned physical development?
2. What changes to these conditions were proposed through the
master plan process, in terms of additional facilities
requirements generated, modification of previous planning,
and additional physical development proposed?
3. What has happened since completion of the master plan, in
terms of proposed physical development accomplished, pro-
grammed or dropped, and additional development accomplished
or programmed?
For the five installations without master plans, accomplished or
programmed facilities development was compiled for the same time frame
and analyzed for comparative purposes.
Since a quantitative analysis yields results only as valid as the data
input, certain assumptions need to be made to form a more equitable
basis for comparison:
1 . The master plan program did not, in most cases, develop "new"
facilities requirements, but crystallized those previously
unidentified;
2. Conditions viewed as substantive benefits of the master plan
process include; (a) any "new"facilities requirements that could,
in fact, be attributed to the master plan process, particularly if
they have been built or included in current construction
programs, and (b) major changes in pre-existing land use or
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siting of proposed facilities affected through the master plan
process;
3. Conditions viewed as substantive deficits of the master plan
process include; (a) changes in proposed land use or siting of
facilities subsequent to completion of the master plan, and
(b) facilities projects proposed by the master plan and sub-
sequently dropped.
4. "New" projects, initiated since completion of the master
plan, are considered benefits, if judged to conform to the
basic plan, and deficits, if judged to be non-conforming;
5. Most of the projects proposed by the master plan and either
built or included in current construction programs would have
fared the same without the plan. That is to say, there is no
bonus for having a master plan in terms of securing funding
for needed development.
6. Comparative physical development analysis should exclude
utilities systems, as they are often neglected in the master
plan process and are, in fact, subservient to the super-
structure of operational facilities.
The second portion of the analysis is addressed to master plan value;
it assesses in qualitative terms, the effectiveness of master plans in
satisfying the major perceived needs of installations and other program
beneficiaries, and estimates the benefits derived by the presence of master
plans which would have been precluded by their absence.
This evaluation has been drawn exclusively from opinions rendered
in the master planning survey. Accordingly, the findings are totally
subjective. Were ample time and data available, the evaluation could
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have been made on a more objective and quantitative basis. For example,
master plan effectiveness could be related directly to program goal
accomplishment in terms of:
1 . Facilities operational and maintenance costs - (lower?)
2. Community relations - (fewer complaints?)
3. Workload output - (higher or of better quality?)
4. Personnel morale - (fewer complaints or disturbances?)
5. Facilities site development costs - (lower?)
6. Lead time for facilities acquisition - (shorter?)
7. Pollution control and energy conservation - (better record of
abatement and savings?)
8. Capability to accept unforeseen change - (improved?)
This depth of analysis may be accomplished at a later date, but the
format and criteria could be established now and data collection could
begin immediately.
Analysis: The master plans for the five installations selected pro-
posed 232 facilities construction projects for implementation, excluding
utilities projects. Of these, 70 were pre-existing, of which 56 were
accepted without change and 14 were resited in accordance with proposed
land use concepts. These master plans initiated 162 "new" facilities pro-
jects, some of which can be attributed directly to the master planning process.
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Between FY 1971 and 1975, inclusive, 40 projects were constructed
at these installations, of which 26 were included in the master plans and
14 were new items, generated by changing requirements. Of the 26
master plan projects, 21 were built in conformance with the plan
recommendations and five were built at alternative locations. Of these
five, two were the result of the designated site having been preempted
for other use, and three were due to inadequacies of the designated site
at the time of project design. Of the 14 "new" projects constructed,
eight were totally new requirements and six were "substitutes". These
"substitute" projects were, without exception, rehabilitiations,
expansions, or other modifications of existing structures financed through
"non-appropriated funds". They were deemed less expensive or more
expedient than new construction, but are considered non-con forming for
evaluative purposes. Of the eight totally new requirements, four were
considered to be in conflict with the approved master plan concepts.
As of November 1975, 113 projects were included in the current
31
Military Construction Program Objectives for these five installations.
Of these 113 projects, 90 have been sited in accordance with the master
plan recommendations, and three have been resited due to preemption of
the designated sites. Of the remainder, 19 are "new" projects and one
is a "substitute" project. The estimated cost of the programmed projects
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is $276,829,000. Of the 232 master plan projects proposed, 107 have
been dropped due to loss of requirement.
For comparison, the five installations without master plans have had 53
projects constructed in the FY 1971-1975 time frame. They also have 123
projects included in the current Program Objectives, at a total estimated
cost of $195,283,000. All of these facilities projects have been reviewed
for conformance with applicable planning criteria and have ultimately
been approved on that basis.
Graphic comparisons of the above statistics are shown on Figure 13.
This data can be related to master plan effectiveness through use of the
assumptions made earlier, as criteria, and establishment of appropriate
standards. "Positive" values include master plan or "new" projects
built or programmed for construction in accordance with approved master
plan concepts. "Negative" values include master plan projects or "new"
projects built or programmed for construction in violation of approved
master plan concepts, "substitute" projects, and master plan projects
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FIGURE 13: MASTER PLAN IMPLEMENTATION STATUS
Master plan projects receive full value; "new", "substitute" and
"dropped" projects receive half value; and both built and programmed
projects receive equal value, since the master plan process cannot
increase the rate of facilities acquisition and should not be penalized
for this inability.
The maximum positive value would then be achieved by having all
master plan projects built or programmed in conformance with approved
concepts, no master plan projects dropped or substituted, and any "new"
projects developed in conformance with approved plan concepts. This
situation would yield a minimum positive value of +232, the total number
of master plan projects proposed. Conversely, the maximum negative
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value would be achieved by having all master plan projects built or pro-
grammed, and any "new" projects developed, accomplished in violation
of the approved plan concepts. This situation would yield a minimum
negative value of -232. The "break even" point is thus "zero", which
may be assumed to constitute the minimum level of effectiveness tolerable,
A reasonable goal, or "par value", may be assumed as lying midway
between the "break even" and maximum possible value, or +116. On
this basis, then, the five installation master plans examined had an
average value of +59, derived as shown below.
ACTION NO. IMPACT VALUE TOTAL
Master plan projects built
or programmed in accordance
with approved plan concepts 111 POSITIVE FULL +111.0
Master plan projects built
or programmed in violation
of approved plan concepts 8 NEGATIVE FULL - 8.0
"New" projects built
or programmed in accordance
with approved plan concepts 23 POSITIVE HALF +11.5
"New" projects built
or programmed in violation
of approved plan concepts 4 NEGATIVE HALF - 2.0
"Substitute" projects built
or programmed 7 NEGATIVE HALF - 3.5
Master plan projects dropped -
(total, less "substitutes") 100 NEGATIVE HALF -50.0
NET VALUE + 59.0
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The master plan program for the five selected installations has thus
achieved about half of the established "par value" for implementation
effectiveness. This is indicative of substantial room for improvement,
particularly in the retention of master plan projects in the construction
program. Additional weighting could have been ascribed to "new"
projects developed through the master plan program. It seems that this
may have resulted in a trade-off, however, since the aggregate number
of master plan projects built or programmed is almost equal to the number
dropped.
So much for implementation. We now turn to considerations of
master plan quality. Opinions offered in the master planning survey
contained few surprises, but lend the weight of evidence to intuitive
judgments and speculation. One assumption that must be made here is
that acceptance of a master plan by the installation and its chain-of-
command, and approval by the Chief of Naval Operations, constitutes
achievement of at least a minimum level of acceptability; that is, the
plan has met all stipulated requirements. The test for relative quality,
then, must look to the program beneficiaries.
Who are the beneficiaries? The assumption that an installation is
the only beneficiary of its master plan is a pitfall common to planners and
managers throughout the Navy. The totality of master plan purpose is
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sometimes obscured by parochial concerns, but in truth, a master plan is
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different things to different people, and never a single purpose entity.
Prevailing local needs are conceded to be first priority, but not to the
exclusion of headquarters and departmental level interests. I cannot see
a basis for wide divergence, however, if the program objectives have
been correctly interpreted.
The results of the master planning survey are summarized as follows:
1 . There was general agreement among participants that the master
plan implementation procedures relate "moderately well" to the
stated program objectives, goals and policies ("2.1" rating on a
"1" to "5" basis).
2. Staff believes the ensuing physical development at installations
has followed the master plan recommendations "moderately"
closely ("2.2" average). Installations believe it has followed
only "marginally" closely ("3.0" average). They all agree
that, historically, implementation has been closer to the spirit
than the letter of the recommendations.
3. Staff believes the most important factor in successful plan
implementation is good coordination between all parties involved
Installations believe the most important factor is regular and
frequent updating and review of the plan,
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4. Suggestions for improving the process of timely and consistent
master plan implementation are:
Staff - Shorten the master plan preparation and
review process and provide a staff planner
at each major installation.
Installations - Increase headquarters level recognition
of the importance of the master plan and
provide regular review and update.
5. The most important real needs for facilities development at most
installations are:
Staff - Definition of general land use boundaries
and protection of the installation from
community encroachment. (The latter
item was rated low by Consultants.)
Consultants - Satisfaction of all facilities deficiencies
and resolution of access, circulation and
parking problems. (The latter was rated
low by Staff and Installations.)
Installations - Definition of general land use boundaries
and satisfaction of all facilities deficiencies,
6. Staff and Consultants believe the master plan program has
satisfied the real facilities development needs of most installa-
tions "fairly well" ("1 .8" average). Installations believe it has
satisfied them only "marginally well" ("3.1 " average).
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7. There is an apparent divergence of philosophy between interest
groups surveyed on the principal value of master plans, which
harks back to the conflicts over master plan purpose discussed
in Section II. A., "Program Objectives". Staff advocate the
concept of generality—that the plans' principal value is as a
guide to orderly physical development in terms of compatible
land use objectives. Consultants are more problem oriented,
believing that the plans' major benefits are the solution of
existing problems hampering efficient operations. Installations
favor a project approach aimed at a responsive facilities con-
struction program based on phasing of priority requirements and
ultimate satisfaction of calculated deficiencies. There was a
consensus that all of these items are important, but Installations
were more pessimistic than Staff or Consultants on the degree to
which they have been successfully accommodated in the master
plan program.
8. The major weakness in master plan effectiveness is the inability
to anticipate and accommodate change, whether it occurs at
local or departmental levels, or is internal or external to the
Naval establishment. Unanticipated changes, both "structural"
(mission, workload, organization, etc.) and "operational"
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(policies, priorities, criteria, etc.) occur too frequently to be
dismissed as happenstance, and result in a steady erosion of
master plan value.
9. Other limitations to master plan effectiveness are created by lack
of interest in the program at both the installation and headquarters
levels, inadequate coordination between the various actors in
the planning process, and loss of continuity resulting from con-
tinual rotation of military management personnel. These factors
all relate to program management, rather than program structure,
and are discussed in the following section.
10. Despite its imperfections, the master planning program provides
a valuable service to the Naval shore establishment. It should
be modified as necessary and within the limits of practicality,
to increase its effectiveness; but it should not be terminated.
It seems ample to observe that the state of Naval facilities
planning in the early 1960's, described as "chaotic", prompted
establishment of the master planning program as, ". . .the basic
requirement for successful multi-year programming. . .to upgrade




Objectives and Criteria: Assess the adaptability of the master
planning program to its effective local management within the scope of
available resources and prevailing administrative policies. Determine
the potential for increased master plan productivity, in terms of both
quantity and quality, and whether this can best be achieved through
restructuring of the program or the organization.
The evaluation is conducted on the basis of responses to the master
planning survey conducted for this paper and review of applicable
literature.
Background: The Navy planning organization is broadly described
in Part I. A. Master planning and related services are accomplished by
NAVFAC Headquarters and six Engineering Field Divisions (EFD's) which
are dispersed geographically to serve beneficiaries on a sectoral basis.
Targets for master planning accomplishment are assigned annually to each
EFD, with Headquarters assisting where appropriate.
Headquarters and each EFD maintain master planning branches com-
prising 10 to 22 professional and technical personnel, and administrative
support as required. Typically, the master plan branch is organized into
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two or three master plan teams and a technical support section. The
teams conduct most of the activities associated with master plan
preparation, including administration of planning service contracts
where plans are prepared by consultants. The technical support section
works with; (1) master plan implementation, including performance of
facility siting reviews, administration of General Development Maps,
and assistance in the conduct of special planning studies of a "current"
nature, and (2) master plan production, including provision of graphic,
editing, typing and publication support to the master plan teams.
Once an assignment is made to a team, the process generally
follows the pattern described in the master planning directives, including
program formulation, data collection, field investigation, analysis and
concept development, review of alternatives, selection of a preferred
concept, and development of recommendations, with supporting data.
A pre-planning conference is held at the installation to introduce the
actors, review the scope of work and schedule of accomplishment, and
agree on planning goals and procedures. Presentations and reviews are
then made at appropriate stages of progress; always at completion of the
"preliminary" and "pre-final" phases, and usually at several intermediate
points as well.
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Input to the master planning process is made by both the installation
(specific problem areas, special requirements and constraints) and the
installation's headquarters office (mission and workload requirements,
projected staffing, and broad goals and objectives). Information on
facilities requirements, physical plant inventory and Military Construc-
tion Program status are provided through the Requirements Planning
branches of the NAVFAC EFD's in the form of computer printouts and
supporting documentation. Other inputs, such as maps, photographs,
functional organizational charts, regional and vicinity data, etc., are
available through various sources at the EFD's and the installations.
Field investigation is normally very extensive, requiring familiariza-
tion with both the installation physical plant and its operation, and the
installation's setting within the local environment. Input data must be
verified and adjusted to provide utility of purpose, organizational and
functional inter-relationships must be noted, and relevant social,
economic, political and environmental factors must be considered in
their relationship to the master plan objectives.
Planning analysis and concept development are, of course, the
"creative" aspects of the process, in which goals, objectives, require-
ments and potentials are weighed against criteria, standards,
capabilities and other constraints, and a set of physical development
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alternatives is derived. This phase is then presented for review and
comment to the installation and its chain-of-command, and other
interested parties as appropriate.
Following receipt of comments and selection of a preferred develop-
ment concept, the plan is essentially completed and given another round
of review. Upon receipt of all comments the plan is completed, published
and submitted for approval by the Chief of Naval Operations. The end-
item format and contents are as described in Part II . B., "Program
Directives".
The foregoing outlines the basic master planning model as prescribed
in the directives. It is, in theory, a clean cut, straightforward process
which appears to be efficient, purposeful and effective. In practice,
this has not always been the case. Previous sections of this paper have
addressed the purpose and effectiveness of the program; this section con-
siders its efficiency.
Discussion: The master planning survey questionnaire was sent to
NAVFAC Headquarters and each of the EFD's. Responses were received
from Headquarters and all but one EFD, and the sections on "program
management" are summarized as follows:
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1 . "Fixed" teams are preferred over "flexible" teams for master
planning purposes, and assignments are normally made by
geographic location of the project, depending on team back-
ground and orientation.
2. The "optimum" team size for a "typical" master plan assignment
is considered to be four personnel, with the team leader
devoting most of his time to organizing, scheduling, coordinating,
etc.
3. Shore Facilities Planning and Programming System data (com-
puter printouts regarding facilities requirements, physical plant
inventory, etc.) are used extensively in master plan preparation,
but are only marginally useful as they are often outdated and/or
incomplete for master planning purposes.
4. Approximately 50 percent of the master planning branch workload
is devoted to master plans, regional complex plans and other
targeted planning studies. The balance is devoted to non-
targeted special studies, general administration and technical
support functions. About one-third of the master planning
branch workload is devoted to "in-house" preparation of master
plans and regional complex plans.
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5. Non -targeted workload items, such as special planning studies,
are generated by, in descending order of frequency;
a. District Commandants
b. Fleet commands
c. Local (EFD) command
d. Field activities (installations)
e. NAVFAC Headquarters
f. Other commands and agencies.
6. The specific nature of non-targeted workload is described as, in
descending order of impact;
a. Special planning studies
b. Briefings and presentations
c. Coordination and liaison
d. Meetings and conferences
e. Point papers and progress reports
7. Productivity, in terms of master plan output, measured against
both absolute capabilities and established targets, is considered
only "fair" ("2.4" rating on a "1" to "5" basis); productivity,
in terms of master plan quality, is considered "good" ("1 .3"
rating). If a choice must be made between quantity and
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quality in master planning, quality must take precedence, but
both are considered essential to the program's viability.
8. Where significant changes to the master plans are required
prior to their final submittal, the reasons most frequently given
are, in descending order;
a. Changes in installation mission, workload, staffing, etc.,
b. Other changes at the installation level, such as rotation
of personnel, new policies or requirements, etc.
,
c. Inadequate compilation or analysis of planning data.
9. In general, master plans prepared by planning service contract
have been of lower quality than those prepared "in-house" . The
preference is overwhelmingly in favor of "in-house" accomplish-
ment because this method affords more direct access to Navy
planning data, more direct inter-personal contact, and more
flexibility for absorption of delays, program changes, etc.
10. The major obstacles to high productivity, in terms of master
plan output are, in descending order;
a. Interruptions due to "brush fires" and other priority work
of immediate nature,
b. Extensive periods of presentation and review,
c. Inadequate personnel and fiscal resources.
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The major obstacles, in terms of master plan quality, are;
a. Extensive periods of presentation and review
b. Interruptions due to "brush fires" and other priority work
of immediate nature
c. Unforeseen changes in the internal or external environ-
ment of the installation
11 . Suggestions for improvement of productivity in master plan output
and quality are, in descending order,
a. Modify and condense the presentation and review process
b. Isolate master plan teams from distraction and interruption
c. Gain acceptance, at all levels, of the fact that the master
plan cannot solve all of the installation's problems, cannot
foretell the future, and cannot be extended indefinitely as
an uncompleted task
d. Increase master planning branch staffing
e. Obtain more timely and definitive guidance and data input
from headquarters and department levels
12. NAVFAC EFD's are able to effectively meet assigned master
plan targets, within the scope and configuration of present
resources and prevailing management policies, "most of the
time". Limitations in this regard are attributed to, (1 ) manpower
shortages and, (2) local management policies.
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13. The "optimal" time that should be allotted to a master plan of
"typical" complexity, considering all relevant factors, is 9 to
12 months, including a total of about eight to nine weeks for
presentations and review periods.
14. Review periods usually exceed eight to nine weeks by a sub-
stantial amount. Although this is conceded to be a major
obstacle in the master planning process, it is a requirement
and it is unlikely that it can be reduced very much. One
suggestion is to eliminate all but one ("pre-final") presentation,
and to stage informal briefings and reviews at earlier phases as
appropriate; another is to concentrate on education of the
installation and its chain-of-command to the "facts of life"
noted in Item 11 . c. above.
15. Diversion of master planning team personnel to other, non-
targeted "brush fire" type work is considered a substantial, but
not sole, cause of delays in master plan preparation. Although
this is conceded to be an inescapable reality which must be
accommodated, it could best be alleviated by a change in local
management policies.
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16. The major problems with effective accomplishment of the master
planning program rest mainly at the NAVFAC EFD level, and
not at Headquarters. These can best be solved by increasing
the planning staff and by reorganizing functions within the
planning division.
Conclusions : There has been a continued growth in the scope and
diversity of Navy planning service obligations without a commensurate
increase in resources, and this has impaired the efficient management of
the program. Spreading limited money and manpower over an ever-larger
area of responsibility has resulted in a growing backlog of unaccomplished
workload, which is both frustrating and counter-productive. The purpose
and objectives of the Navy's master planning program, while not clearly
defined, are assumed to be reasonable and compelling; therefore, the
means to increased output must be found in the application of local
administrative policy. It is concluded that:
1 . Unreliable data is detrimental to master plan quality, and
time spent in augmenting and updating obsolete and incomplete
data is a severe limitation to output as well. Experience has
shown that the Navy's computerized planning data bank is not
sufficiently accurate, complete or current for effective use in
the master planning process.
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2. Navy master planning staff members spend an inordinate amount
of time on non-targeted planning tasks which impair productivity
while contributing little or nothing to target accomplishment.
This situation can lead to a diminished sense of purpose and
consequent loss of overall productivity.
3. Time spent in preparation for and conduct of presentations,
briefings and reviews is an excessive portion of the total master
planning effort. This not only results in low output, but effects
master plan quality, through redundancy and obsolescence, as
well. Presentations and reviews are essential to the acceptance
and subsequent use of master plans, as well as to provide needed
guidance and input; but the time spent in these activities should
be substantially condensed.
4. While the consensus of this portion of the master planning survey
was one of general satisfaction with the quality of plans produced
to date, the findings discussed in the preceding section ("Program
Effectiveness") indicate considerable room for improvement. I
interpret this to mean that, while master plans have satisfied the
stipulated program requirements quite well, they have been less
effective in addressing the specific needs and uncertainties of
their beneficiaries in the "real world" situation.
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5. There is general agreement that master plan output is less than
desirable and that more planning resources are the most direct
solution. This is probably true, but a major staffing increase is
not only doubtful—the reverse is more likely. Both economics
and the principles of "Parkinson's Law" drive an understandable
tendency to minimize staff, particularly in a public service
endeavor. This rationale is shown on Figure 14, which indicates
the "cutoff point" for resource allocations beyond which
37
diminishing marginal utility occurs.
6. There is another side to the issue of productivity which concerns
performance on an individual, rather than an organizational,
basis. The Navy planning process always operates against a
backlog of unaccomplished workload. As shown on Figure 15,
this backlog can be increased to point, with a commensurate
increase in unit productivity or output, which is generated by
a sense of urgency. Beyond this "saturation point", however,
unit productivity may begin a decline as apathy replaces
urgency in individual attitudes. If the backlog of unaccomplished
workload continues to grow in relation to measured output, it's
conceivable that organizational net output could decrease even
38
with an increase in resources. I cannot quantify my belief,
but it seems probable that the Navy's master planning program
is experiencing this phenomenon.
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FIGURE 15: INDIVIDUAL OUTPUT
VERSUS WORKLOAD
7. If more resources are not to be forthcoming, and a reduced
workload is equally improbable, then the Navy must develop
a way to produce and maintain useful master plans more
quickly. Unfortunately, some of the possible solutions appear
to be beyond the planners' grasp, at least for the present.
Some of the more plausible solutions are advanced in the final
part of this paper.
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PART III: SYNTHESIS AND PROPOSALS
A. EVALUATION SUMMARY
The evaluation contained in Part II is structured in terms of program
goal attainment, master planning procedures and documentation, program
output and cost, value and effectiveness, and implications for manage-
ment. The major findings and conclusions are summarized in the following
paragraphs to gain a better perspective for considerations of program
improvement.
Program Objectives:
1 . Objectives, goals and policies contained in official directives
do not provide a sound basis for the type of evaluation attempted:
a. The objectives are too general and somewhat irrelevant to
the master planning program
b. The goals are set on an annual rather than a long-term
basis
c. The policies are limited to only two aspects of the master
planning program.
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2. There is no clear statement of master plan purpose in the
directives. "Requirements" and "definitions" of master
planning do not amount to the same thing, as they fail to
explain the need for and potential value of the program. As
a result, this evaluation was largely based on assumed purposes,
derived empirically from the available literature.
3. There is an apparent conflict in ideology between program
participants and beneficiaries regarding master plan concept.
Participants (staff and consultants) advocate a long-range,
generalized approach which emphasizes basic land use
objectives and ultimate development potential; beneficiaries
(installations and their chains-of-command) want a shorter
range, specialized approach which addresses established require-
ments, project development and construction phasing by priority
of need. The philosophy gap may not be critically large, but
the symptoms reinforce the need for visible definition of master
plan purpose.
4. The Command policy regarding master plan sensitivity to the
natural environment and the socio-economic structure of the
civilian community has been acknowledged, but the degree of
compliance has been less than possible or desirable.
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5. The master planning program has been generally successful in
describing a good physical environment for conduct of present
and projected activities; it has failed to provide adequately
for accommodation of unforeseen changes in policy, priorities
or criteria at the departmental level; or in mission, workload
or organization at the local (installation) level.
6. The issue of environmental quality is not addressed in program
objectives, goals and policies, and is a secondary consideration
in the master planning directives. Since the qualitative improve-
ment of the physical environment is a distinguishing characteristic
of the master planning program, it should be given more visible
presence in the instructions.
Program Directives:
1 . The methodology prescribed for master plan preparation in the
official directives is not totally relevant to the attainment of
program goals and objectives. It is too detailed and extensive,
reflecting both a preoccupation with procedure, in lieu of
results, and a tendency to meet the challenge for program
reform by compounding program requirements. The former is
relatively harmless—the latter is deadly.
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2. The documentation prescribed for master plans in the official
directives is not totally relevant to the attainment of program
goals and objectives. It is growing in bulk, as mentioned
above, thus enlarging the dilemma of meeting program goals of
"timeliness" with supercomprehensive plans.
3. Both the procedures and documentation prescribed are too rigid
and inclusive to permit application of needed flexibility in
application. A more compact and generalized directive would
promote expedience in plan completion without necessary loss
of quality.
Program Output:
1 . Initial program targets for master plan preparation and updating
have not been met. Due to the diversion of resources to non-
targeted workload obligations, only two-thirds of the initially
targeted plans have been completed within the specified time
frame, and only one-half of the required updates have been
accomplished.
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2. Master plans take too long to prepare. This is due, in part, to
the workload conflicts mentioned above, but more directly to
the broad scope of planning requirements, to extended periods
of presentation and review, and to delays in obtaining needed
information and guidance.
3. Increased productivity is essential, not only to meet the program
targets, but to improve the response to increasing demands for
other planning services. Furthermore, an increase in output may
result in improved service quality, as well, since delays breed
redundance and obsolescence.
Program Cost:
1 . There are no standards or criteria with which to evaluate the
cost of the master planning program in relation to output, on
either a quantitative or qualitative basis. Since master planning
is an ongoing program with multiple objectives, absolute
expenditures have little meaning beyond cost-per-unit comparisons,
2. Master plans accomplished "in-house" have cost somewhat more
—
perhaps as much as 40 percent—than those performed by
consultants through planning service contracts. "In-house" plans
are considered to be of substantially higher quality than contract
plans, however, so the extra expense may well be justified.
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3. Negation of the master planning program would not have produced
savings equal to its current cost. Likewise, cancellation of the
program would not recover any prior expenditures, nor avoid all
of the obligations remaining. The program furnishes a variety of
ancillary planning services which would have to be separately
funded in its absence.
Program Effectiveness:
1 . The master plan implementation process has produced some "good
news" and some "bad news". The program has been highly
effective in defining facilities requirements and in guiding
their realization as projects, built or programmed in conformance
with approved plan concepts. The program has been rather
ineffective in anticipating and directing the total subsequent
physical development of installations, since a high percentage
of initially proposed projects have been cancelled and a sub-
stantial number of "new" projects have been developed in their
place. The net result is considered positive, but there is
considerable room for improvement.
142 —
2. The rate of master plan implementation has been much slower
than expected, but is proceeding as quickly as fund appropriations
will allow.
3. The major weaknesses in master planning effectiveness are the
inability to (a) maintain conformance with approved plan concepts
throughout the implementation process and (b) anticipate and
accommodate unforeseen changes which affect the plan's validity.
4. Master plans are different things to different people, thus all
questions of value or effectiveness must consider the multiple
beneficiaries of the program. It appears that master plans pro-
duced to date have satisfied the requirements of the program
participants (NAVFAC Headquarters and Engineering Field
Divisions) better than those of the beneficiaries (installations
and their chains-of-command). This seems to be a perverse
situation needful of correction.
5. The master planning program is a vital link to the systematic
upgrading of the Naval shore establishment. It can and should
be improved, but should not be terminated.
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Program Management:
1 . A steady increase in planning workload, without a commensurate
increase in resources, has impaired the effective management of
the master planning program. The additional workload is not in
master plans, but in non-targeted planning services of a diverse
nature
.
2. This situation has resulted in a growing backlog of unaccomplished
workload, which is detrimental to personal attitudes and,
consequently, to unit productivity, in both quantitative and
qualitative terms.
3. Since workload is not likely to diminish, or resources to grow,
the challenge to program management is finding a way to produce
and maintain good master plans more quickly. The essential
program requirements are reasonable and compelling; therefore,
the main burden of solution rests at the local department level.
4. The most potentially effective solutions are not within the
planner's sphere of attainment, but substantive improvement
could be made through functional reorganization and procedural
innovation at the local level.
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B. CONFLICTS AND TRADE-OFFS
The multiple problems identified in the Navy's master planning
program can be reduced to three basic shortcomings: (1) the plans take
too long to prepare; (2) when complete, they are too vulnerable to
manipulation; and, (3) they cannot adequately predict or accommodate
future change. All other considerations are included within or
attributable to these three items. According to the master planning
survey:
1 . Initial delays in plan preparation perpetuate further delays
through redundancy and obsolescence. They are the result of:
a. Extended review periods and excessive presentation
requirements, which are both time-consuming and
frustrating as they are not always productive;
b. Diversion of team planners to non-targeted, "brush
fire" tasks, resulting from manpower limitations and/
or local management policies;
c. Difficulty in obtaining timely and reliable planning
guidance and policy input from headquarters and
departmental levels;
d. Difficulty in obtaining appropriate and current planning
data;
e. A scope of work that tries to do too much—a tendency
within NAVFAC which is supported by the installations
through insistence on supercomprehensive plans;
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2. Completed plans are often disregarded or misused by their
beneficiaries. This is the result of:
a. Lack of management continuity at the installation level due
to frequent changes of command and rotation of departmental
personnel;
b. Personal whim based on "second guesses" and founded on the
principles of first-cost economy and expedience;
c. Substitution of "non-appropriated fund" projects for Military
Construction projects proposed in the master plan, often
resulting in the further retention of obsolete and non-
conforming facilities;
d. Erosion of interest in the value of the plan on the part of
the installation or its chain-of-command; and,
e. Inadequate coordination between all parties in the imple-
mentation process; i.e., NAVFAC Headquarters and the
Engineering Field Divisions, the installations and their
headquarters offices, and Navy Department Headquarters.
3. The "picture of the future" developed by the master planning
process is often out of focus. This is the result of unanticipated
changes in:
a. Policies, priorities and organization structure made at
headquarters level, reflecting shifts in the national
economy, political mood or defense posture;
b. Facility planning factors and siting criteria, resulting from
increased sensitivity to issues of environmental protection,
public safety and personnel living standards; and,
c. Mission, tasks, base loading, workload or functional
organization at the installation level.
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Suggestions for improvement to the master planning program are abun-
dant. Those most frequently cited in the master planning survey include:
1 . Provision of more flexibility in master plan preparation procedures
and document format, with less emphasis on environmental impact,
area factors, installation description, and architectural character;
2. More articulate guidance from headquarters and departmental
levels on planning program, objectives and constraints, and
faster response to presentations and review phases;
3. Revised local management policies regarding "brush fires"; i.e.,
isolation of master plan teams from internal disruption;
4. Better definition of basic master planning goals and objectives in
the official program directives;
5. Keener awareness by all participants of the multiple purposes of
the master plan;
6. Closer coordination of related actions and obligations at all
levels of concern; i.e., maintaining a better understanding of
the issues involved and a higher sense of urgency in their resolution;
7. More generous staffing, including provision of a "staff planner"
at all major installations;
8. More "in-house" and less contract master plan preparation;
9. More emphasis on development of sound basic concepts and
alternatives and more frequent review and updating of plans; and,
10. More frequent and candid interface with the civilian community
on matters of mutual concern.
It is obvious that the various problems are somewhat interrelated and
that the proposed solutions are not all mutually inclusive. Furthermore,
some of the proposed solutions are plainly unrealistic, as they would either
violate command policy or require the input of non-existant resources.
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There are some real conflicts between program goals and policies on
the one hand, and the various planning requirements and constraints which
have been identified, on the other. There is the potential for trade-offs,
however, and appropriate areas of compromise can be identified, if not
resolved. The list below has been compiled through the insight of the fore-
going research with Command goals designated as (G) and Command policies
designated as (P). All other factors are termed either "requirements" (R) or
"constraints" (C), depending on their basic characteristic.
TIMELY OUTPUT (P)
IN-HOUSE PREPARATION (P) .
TARGETED MASTER PLANS (G)
PRIORITY REQUIREMENTS (R) .
INITIAL PREPARATION (R) . .
DEFENSE REQUIREMENTS (R)
.
PROGRAM QUALITY (R) . . .
LONG-RANGE POTENTIAL (R)
GENERAL APPROACH (R/C) .
UNIFORMITY (C/R)

























These sets are not mutually exclusive; there are numerous overlaps and
cross-relationships. They can be synthesized, however, into two basic
dichotomies: "innovation" (what is needed) versus "conformity" (what is
required), and "workload" (what is required) versus "resources" (what is
available). This study will not attempt to suggest the precise areas of
trade-off, but will, instead, consider ways in which the conflicts can be
minimized.
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C. CAUSES AND EFFECTS
The objective of this paper is to review the Navy's master planning
program in depth and to identify its major strengths and weaknesses. The
findings of the research are believed to be conclusive in most areas and at
least informative in the remainder. The program has been assessed in terms
of both concept and procedure, and the findings of the master planning
survey indicate a stronger consensus on the latter issue. This is to say,
while there is general agreement on the issue of planning process, the
succinct program purpose has neither been clearly identified, nor agreed
upon by the interest groups involved.
Shall the master planning program focus on long-range objectives;
general concepts for ultimate development of the shore establishment to
support the Navy of the future? Should it focus on shorter range
objectives; specific plans and programs to satisfy known requirements and
immediate concerns? Or should it attempt to do both; to be both general
and specific, according to need and prevailing circumstances?
Obviously, the last option, "comprehensiveness", is the most
compelling as it would resolve disputes over concept and purpose while
addressing the total facilities planning needs of the Navy. It is also the
most idealistic, presenting both a picture of the future and a formula for
the present.
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The current master planning directive appears to be committed to the
"comprehensive" approach. While the objective is commendable, the
content of the directive fails to offer a solution to the three fundamental
shortcomings of the program; that master plans take too long to prepare,
are too vulnerable to misuse after completion, and do not adequately fore-
cast or accommodate future change. The problem causes given in the
master planning survey seem to properly account for the shortcomings
noted. On closer examination, however, it appears that these "causes"
are actually residual effects which are underlain by more fundamental
causes. There seem to be two forces at work, which are deeply imbedded
in Navy master planning philosophy and which tend to oppose any scheme
for program reform.
The first is the orientation of the Navy planning system, and indeed
of many planning agencies, toward a rigid methodology based on achieve-
ment of a final and static objective. This is the "end-state" planning
criticized by Branch and others as being unresponsive and ineffective to
the needs of a dynamic and pluralistic society. While the Navy is not
a pluralistic society per se, it does contain a wealth of special interest
groups; while it is not clearly a dynamic institution in terms of political
innovation, it must continually react to external stimuli impelled by
changing national interests.
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James R. Schlesinger distinguishes between two general approaches
to planning, referred to as "Cook's tour" planning and "Lewis-and-Clark"
planning:
"Cook's tour planning rests, implicitly or explicitly,
on the supposition that the future is sufficiently certain
that we can chart a straight course years in advance.
In it, direction, speed, size of committment and
achievement milestones (not decision points) are
indicated with, at least, rough precision. By contrast,
what may be termed Lewis-and-Clark planning
acknowledges that many alternative courses of action
and forks in the road will appear, but their precise
character and timing cannot be anticipated. Neither
the size of committment nor even the direction of
movement should be stipulated too far in advance.
At the end of a period one can retrospectively examine
the paths pursued, which include many abandoned
initiatives or experiments and many hard (and maybe
erroneous) choices. Only limited confidence could
have been placed in advanced predictions regarding
which options would be chosen, when the choices
would be made, or how long alternative courses of
action would be pursued before abandonement. Retro-
spectively one may map what has taken place, but the
planning function is not to chart a precise course of
action. Rather it is to prepare to cope with the
uncertain terrain of the future, to note the signs in
the environment that a decision point has been reached,
and to respond in a timely fashion."
He continues; emphasizing the need for flexibility:
"Wherever uncertainties are substantial, the balance
should shift in the direction of Lewis-and-Clark
planning. . .Nevertheless, in all bureaucracies there
are strong pressures to go too far in the quest for
Cook's tour planning. In part, this is inevitable in
large organizations as a concommitant to the need
for cohesion and the cost of communications. In part,
the pressure is understandable since it may permit
committing others to our view of the world, our
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objectives, and our strategies. In part, it is a form
of casual laziness. Characteristicially the tendency
toward precise planning goes much too far. . .the less
well known the future terrain, the greater the losses
in planning by simple Cook's tour methods."^
Schlesinger offers some further insights into planning philosophy which
are appropriate to this discussion:
".. .as one adds to the dimensions of the plan by
increasing the number of issues covered, planning
ceases to bear any relation to a prescription of
activities that will be undertaken in the future.
Instead planning appropriately becomes a vast hedge,
indicating the character, the means of acquisition,
and the use of certain instrumentalities—of certain
sets of circumstances should materialize. Rather than
providing an exact prescription of activities, a good
plan will admittedly provide no more than the roughest
guidelines. . .If plans for future activities are adhered
to, the results will inevitably be less than optimal.
We are not clarivoyant. Prescription of future
activities requires us to have more knowledge of the
future than we possibly can. . .a good plan should be
viewed as a complicated structure to foster intelligent
hedging. It ought not be viewed as a prescription for
future activities."
He notes the weaknesses of prescriptive planning and offers an alternative:
"If planning is in the nature of prescription, it is
bound to be costly—and will probably be inaccurate
as well. For planning variegated activities under
conditions of uncertainty, indicative planning
—
because it lacks precision and rigidity— is the
appropriate means for attaining the best result possible,
though not the best possible result. In this case, as in
others, the hypothetical best can be an enemy of the
attainable good. "3
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Schlesinger is speaking of centralized operational planning in the
Department of Defense, but his rationale can be extended, with little
qualification, to facilities master planning in the Navy. While "Cook's
tour" planning would appear to have an excellent chance for success in
the Navy's planning system, which is highly rational and controlled, it's
application to the master planning program has not fully succeeded, as
shown by the evidence on hand. Schlesinger 's article establishes an
attractive case for planning as a dynamic process to guide enlightened
decision making; a view shared by at least some Navy planners.
The implication of this discussion is that the Navy's master planning
program is, indeed, too highly structured and prescriptive to permit
effective physical development of the shore establishment on a necessarily
incremental basis. It's not that the scope of concern is too braod, nor the
aggregate requirements too extensive; it is, rather, that they are applied
unilaterally and are required to be addressed at a single point in time.
This approach inhibits flexibility in planning for individual requirements
and necessitates making hundreds of decisions in advance of symptomatic
phenomena. It results in extended periods of plan preparation and
assures the need for early and recurring plan updating.
The second cause underlying the program's shortcomings is a psycho-
logical alienation of the master plan beneficiaries from the mainstream of
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activity. The installations and their superiors-in-command apparently
don't feel that they are a vital part of the process; they seem to feel,
rather, that master planning is "NAVFAC's game", which must be tolerated
but not necessarily endorsed.
This attitude understandably stems, in part, from apprehension over
the past record and it's legacy of unfulfilled promises. A stronger factor,
however, is that the beneficiaries are placed in an essentially passive
role throughout the master planning process. All substantive action is
taken by the "participants" (planning staff or consultants), and the final
plan document is presented to the installation as a "gift".
It's true that the beneficiaries are consulted frequently throughout
the planning process and make inputs at various stages of the program
development. In addition, they are obligated to endorse the final plan
prior to its submittal for approval by the Chief of Naval Operations.
While it cannot be claimed that their needs or desires have been neglected,
it follows that their contributions have been first induced and then
translated into "staff recommendations". At each point of contact, the
installation is presented with a completed accomplishment and asked to
\
respond. While the command staff may approve what they see, they have not
been privy to the hundreds of cumulative decisions that must go into such
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an accomplishment. It is little wonder, then, that they look upon the
document as "NAVFAC's plan" and receive it with less than total
enthusiasm.
i
This is not to imply that participant-beneficiary relationships are
always adverse or artificial—they are not—but it seems a fact that Navy
planners tend toward an attitude of possessiveness regarding the master
plan, and of acquiescence regarding the installation and its superiors-in-
command. This attitude inevitably results in degradation of commitment
on the part of the beneficiaries. (Note the distinction used in this paper
between "participants" and "beneficiaries"; indicative of the separate
roles maintained.) It seems reasonable to expect that, as "participants"
in the master planning process, the installation and its superiors-in-
command would view their role in a different light and respond in a more
constructive manner.
The alienation described here is not limited to the planners, the
installations and their superiors-in-command. It permeates the entire
structure of the Naval establishment and is reflected in the frequent
inadequacy of fundamental guidance furnished by headquarters and
departmental levels at the outset of the planning process. While the
planner has a special need for the best information available, experience
has shown a strong reluctance within the higher eschelons of Navy
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management to accommodate this need. Whether this reticence is
intentional, stemming from mistrust of the motives or consequences of
"enlightened" planning, or simply an innocent failure to recognize the
critical relationships involved, is not known. It seem probable, however,
that the instilling of a higher sense of departmental involvement in the
planning process would stimulate better response to program needs.
This "response gap" can be likened to the procedural conflicts noted
by Altshuler and others in the civilian planning sector, resulting from the
5
political isolation of the planning process. It would seem that Navy
planners could learn a good deal from the experience of the civilian
sector, and find ways to better integrate the roles of "participants" and
"beneficiaries" in the master planning program.
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D. RECOMMENDATIONS
The findings and conclusions of this research have led to the formula-
tion of three major proposals for improvement of the Navy's master planning
program. They are to,(l) realign the planning procedures to a more "process-
oriented" approach, (2) realign the planning concept to a more "policy-
oriented" approach, and (3) expand the planning data base to include all
information necessary for effective master plan accomplishment. Each of
these proposals can stand alone and each could provide explicit benefits
for the program. Taken together, however, they can minimize the various
obstacles confronting effective program execution under the present
structure and enhance current efforts in the fields of regional complex and
logistics systems planning.
1 . Process Planning Approach: This proposal is to move the Navy's
master planning procedures closer to those of the "indicative"
planning described by Schlesinger and the "continuous" planning
advocated by Branch. The proposal is motivated by the
recognized need for:
a. Higher master plan productivity, in the aspects of
both initial preparation and periodic updating;
b. Faster response to the growing demand for ancillary
planning services;
— 158
c. Accommodation of an increasing number of supplemental
master plan requirements; and,
d. Higher credibility and usefulness in the master plans
produced.
The approach suggested is not radically different from
established concepts or procedures. The essence and primary
departures are a deeper involvement of the "beneficiaries" in
the master planning process and accomplishment of plan elements
on an incremental basis, according to established priorities.
Thus, the most essential tasks are performed first and, upon
reaching a point of significant accomplishment where substantive
decisions can be made, the process is temporarily suspended.
The planning team moves on to another task while the initial
effort is undergoing implementation and evaluation.
The initial plan document would be more compact and
generalized than those of the present, thus could accept
marginal changes in installation size and structure without
degradation of basic concepts.
The plan would be augmented in scope and content from
time to time, according to knowledge gained and prevailing
needs; thus, the plan would become more comprehensive over
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time and updating would be a continuing process. Changes in
requirements, policies and criteria, and their impact on the plan,
would be acknowledged and assessed immediately and necessary
revisions would be made at the earliest opportunity. Elements of
the plan containing information subject to frequent revision (base
loading and workload data, inventory of existing assets, Military
Construction Program status, etc.) would be updated regularly and
replaced in the plan document.
The primary elements of the "process plan" are a policy
section which is discussed in the following paragraphs, and a
proposed land use plan similar to that employed in the current
process. The land use plan would depict long-range land use
concepts based on specific policies and goals of the installation
and its superiors-in-command. It would depict, in general
terms, the basic land use categories and circulation pattern
needed to accommodate current and firmly anticipated require-
ments, allowing for, (a) incremental facilities reorganization to
achieve better functional and environmental capability, (b) the
likely expansion of certain facilities types commensurate with an
increase in present mission or v/orkload, and (c) the potential
for accommodation of additional functions of a compatible
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nature. Secondary elements of the plan would include back-
ground information on the installation and its physical
environment, relevant socio-economic factors, capital
improvement plan, and any other items of special interest,
mandatory or optional, which relate to the installation's
physical development profile and which may require periodic
revision.
2. Policy Planning Approach: This proposal is to move the Navy's
master planning concept closer to that of the "policy plan"
described by Fagin and others. The proposal is based on the
recognition that the most efficient planning procedures cannot
foster rational and compelling decisions if not supported by a
sound policy structure. Rondinelli advocates policy planning
as an action-oriented approach to the management of change,
but cites eight propositions that characterize and limit the
o
effectiveness of policymaking. Review of these has indicated
that they can be more easily managed within the Naval
establishment, however, than in the "highly fragmented, multi-
9
nucleated structure" of urban society.
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Planning based on well articulated policies at all levels of
Navy management would offer many advantages to the master
planning program. The process should start with a clear statement
of program objectives, goals and policies at Navy Headquarters
level. These would define the multi-purpose nature of master
planning and describe its potential benefits to the Navy and
Department of Defense, in general, and to the respective
installations and their superiors-in-command, in particular.
This approach would tend to stimulate a more responsible
commitment from headquarters and departmental levels, in
terms of major planning goals and guidance; and from the
installation level, in terms of personal involvement and con-
tinuity. Furthermore, it would crystallize requirements and
expectations that otherwise may be only implicit, or even
unrecognized.
Policies formulated jointly by the installation, its chain-
of-command and the NAVFAC planning staff, would lend
credibility to the plan and would provide long-range goals upon
which to base incremental decision making and problem solving.
This process would, in short, transform master plan "beneficiaries"
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into "participants" and, more likely than now, good ideas into
realities. At the regional complex level, planning goals and
policies would logically be formulated by the area Naval Base
Commander or District Commandant.
Inclusion of the civilian community in the policymaking
process would tend to reduce friction between the military and
civilian sectors and promote better understanding of both
separate and mutual concerns. Appropriate representatives of
the community should be involved in the earliest stages of
policy formulation at the local level. While they need not be
considered "participants" in the process, their presence could
avert possible conflicts and would facilitate follow-up requests
for information and assistance.
3. Expanded Data Base: This proposal is to enhance the effective-
ness of the planning process through expansion of the role of
information. It is generally agreed that accurate and adequate
information is essential, not only to aid routine decision-making,
but to provide a basis for more accurate forecasting of future
requirements.
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A five-year workload projection, which is now the basis
for Navy facilities programming, is totally inadequate for
physical development planning. Rear Admiral D. G. Iselin,
Vice Commander of NAVFAC, has stated:
"Re-examination of the logic in our shore facilities
planning and programming system has convinced me
that we must re-establish the procedure for defini-
tion and projection of shore activity workload. .
.
A total system discipline must be maintained to
prevent a return to pre-LSR days when arbitrary
policies were used to determine which projects
would be funded. The LSR System is the only
current means of identifying and controlling shore
activity interdependency . " '^
As noted in Part I. B. herein, the Logistics Support Require-
ments (LSR) System has been recently suspended due to problems
in its management.
Another Naval officer, Rear Admiral R. E. Jortberg, of
the office of the Chief of Naval Operations, has expressed
concern that (we) are unable to predict what is likely to happen
in the communities surrounding Naval installations, and that
measures for defining and improving (our) relationships be
instituted.
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NAVFAC's bank of computerized planning data is now
limited to facilities requirements and deficits, physical plant
inventory and Military Construction Program data compiled on
an individual activity basis. Furthermore, the format of this
data is structured for quantitative review of Military Construc-
tion Program submittals; consequently, it is of little use in
resolving the multiple and complex issues which face the master
planning staff on a routine basis.
The recent establishment of concepts for broad-based
planning of Naval regional complexes (such as at San Diego,
California or Norfolk, Virginia) and of logistics support
systems (such as ordnance, ship berthing, aircraft rework, etc.)
places a tremendous burden of data requirements on the system.
For these purposes, information on personnel and on the
capacities, capabilities, inventories and physical condition of
various facilities types must be assembled for broad geographic
areas and programmed for retrieval in various formats. Much
of this data is now available in the offices of the Bureau of
Naval Personnel, Bureau of Medicine and Surgery, Navy
Finance Center, and Naval Materiel Command, among others.
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It is often inaccessible to Navy planners though and, when
available, structured in an inappropriate format.
These factors suggest that information for planning needs
to be not only more timely, but much more accessible and
comprehensive, as well. Three actions appear necessary to
expand the Navy's data base for effective conduct of the
master planning program:
a. The Logistics Support Requirements System should
be reactivated and expanded to include more
definitive "census type" information on military
personnel and their dependents;
b. The system should be "regionalized" to provide
facilities, personnel and functional workload
data for Naval complexes, Naval districts, and
other geographic or operational areas as
appropriate to the needs of current planning
studies; and,
c. Navy data sources external to NAVFAC should
be identified and made accessible to Navy
planners on a reciprocal basis.
4. The Integrated Approach : The combined application of the
three proposals described above is termed the "integrated
planning approach". The essence of the "integrated approach"
is teamwork; responsible cooperation between all the actors in
the planning process, and particularly between the NAVFAC
planning staff and the installations. All physical development
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decisions are made in the light of well-articulated goals and
policies, and on the basis of a well-stocked bank of current
planning data.
A key element in this pursuit is the provision of a permanent
staff planner at each major installation. Many installations now
have such a "planner"; but, typically, planning is not their
primary function as they are burdened with multiple obligations
of more "immediate" concern. A staff planner with a primary
obligation to the installation master plan is essential to the
success of this approach. This need has been recognized within
the planning organization, but scarcity of funds has apparently
12
precluded its realization. Provision of a professional civilian
staff planner at each Naval and Marine Corps installation
requiring a master plan (140 - more or less) would cost the Navy
a maximum of $3,000,000 additional, annually; probably, much
less. It is doubtful that there is a better place in the master
planning program to commit such an expenditure.
Let us view the "integrated planning approach" as an
analog model and "put it to work". The form-giving action is a
redefinition of master planning objectives, goals, policies and
requirements. The following statement of purpose is suggested
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as appropriate to the thrust of the "integrated planning
approach":
Master planning of Naval and Marine Corps shore
installations, regional complexes and logistics
support systems is accomplished by Naval Facilities
Engineering Command as directed by the Chief of
Naval Operations. The purpose of the master
planning program is to assure the economical,
orderly and attractive physical development of
facilities within the aggregate Naval and Marine
Corps physical plant to enhance operational
efficiency, personnel welfare and compatibility
with the external civilian community and
physical environment.
Master plans are multi-purpose instruments to aid
decision-making on current and future physical
development and on facilities management at all
levels of the Department of the Navy and the
Department of Defense. As such, they provide
a wide range of benefits to each of the various
users, ranging from assistance in day-to-day plant
management and interaction with the civilian
community at the installation level, through con-
struction project siting review and general planning
administration at the engineering field division
level,to area coordination and public relations at
the Naval base or district level and, finally, to
Military Construction Programming and operational
policymaking at the headquarters and departmental
'evels. Because of the diversity of their multiple
obligations, and the dynamic nature of Naval
operations, master plans must necessarily be both
broad in scope and general in content. They are
not intended to serve as detailed prescriptions for
future physical development, but as generic guides
to incremental facilities development in accordance
with sound and substantive goals and policies
formulated at each level of responsibility.
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Following the statement of purpose should be a more explicit
set of master planning requirements. The following are suggested
as relevant to the nature of the "integrated planning approach":
Master plans and, where applicable, regional complex
and logistics support systems plans, shall be based on and
reflect in their content:
a. Basic planning objectives, goals and policies
of the Department of Defense and the Depart-
ment of the Navy, and other federal agencies
as designated;
b. Specific development objectives, goals
and policies of the installation, Naval
base or Naval district as appropriate,
and as approved by the Department of
the Navy;
c. Information contained in the documents
of the Naval Shore Facilities Planning
and Programming System and the Naval
Logistic Support Requirements System;
d. Intimate knowledge of the installation
(or complex, district, system, etc.)
mission, tasks, administrative organiza-
tion, functional workload, physical
plant and surrounding social and physical
environment; and,
e. Consideration for expansion and augmen-
tation of the present mission and/or
workload to realize the ultimate resource
capabilities.
The "integrated planning" process begins with the assignment
for accomplishment of a master plan. Advance scheduling should
be made to permit, (a) notification of headquarters and departmental
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levels and request for explicit policies and planning guidance
and (b) notification of the installation and request for assembly
of available planning data, including updating where required.
(The latter is the responsibility of the installation staff planner,
who functions as a member of the planning team.)
The first phase of planning is a general orientation of the
planning team given by the staff planner, including inspection
of the installation physical plant, and discussions with key
departmental personnel on functions and resources.
The second, and crucial phase, is the formulation of
physical development goals and policies for master planning.
This is accomplished by the commanding officer and his staff,
assisted by the chain-of-command representatives and the
planning team. Appropriate representatives of the civilian
community should also be involved in this process, to the
extent permitted by security measures. The result of this
phase is a set of explicit development goals and policies,
along with a scope of work and program of accomplishment,
which are forwarded for approval.
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The third phase is planning analysis and concept develop-
ment. This is accomplished by the planning team, predominantly
within their office, but there is continual exchange of ideas and
information between the planning team and the staff planner.
All issues are discussed before decisions are made, and the
commanding officer is kept constantly abreast of the plan's
progress. Because of this interaction, presentation and review
of the plan at the local level is normally not necessary, but may
be required as a formality or to brief installation staff and
community representatives on the proposed development.
The basic elements of the plan at this stage of completion
would be: a background section, prepared by the staff planner and
containing description of the installation and its environment; a policy
section, containing the development goals and policies, and
the scope of work and program for accomplishment; an analysis
section, stating basic planning assumptions, describing the
problems to be solved, and outlining the approach used in
their solution; and, a proposals section, containing the pro-
posed land use plan and the rationale for its development.
Siting of specific facilities would be limited to currently
programmed projects and significant "new" facilities proposals
resulting from the master planning process.
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The plan is then forwarded for headquarters and depart-
mental level review and approval, and the planning team
moves to its next assignment. It is stressed that environmental
impact and energy conservation issues would be given special
attention in the policy section of the master plan. This,
together with the recognition that the generalized land use
plan cannot offer conclusive evidence of significant environ-
mental impacts or potential energy savings, minimizes the
requirement for a supplemental environmental impact assessment
and energy conservation plan. A capital improvements plan can
and should be developed, however, and this would be
accomplished by the staff planner, commensurate with updating
of the installation's General Development Map and other basic
planning documents which require annual revision.
After approval of the plan, the installation staff planner
would then be responsible for its implementation. This would
include preparation and submittal of construction projects at
sites conforming to the approved land use plan and its formative
goals and policies. The staff planner would be responsible for
keeping all planning data current, notifying the planning team
of any policy changes and orienting new commanding officers
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and installation staff to the plan, thus maintaining continuity
and commitment to its goal.
As stated earlier, this planning concept and process is not a
radical departure from the current program structure—many of
the elements are identical. The significant differences are In
the extent of detail considered, the assignment of planning
responsibilities, the order of accomplishment, and the concept
of the master plan as an instrument of Navy policy. The implied
result of these differences, however, is considered substantial.
The "integrated planning approach" appears to have excellent
potential for speeding the production rate of master plans,
bolstering their immunity from misuse, and increasing their
credibility and usefulness. Also, it would tend to minimize the
impacts of unexpected change which erode the value of
prescriptive planning approaches and thus, the confidence that
can be placed in the overall program. Moreover, the foregoing
proposals appear to be highly applicable to broader based
planning concepts in which the consequences of misdirection
are even more severe.
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5. A final recommendation is that the Navy undertake a program
of systematic master plan evaluation. Some of the requisites
are discussed in Part II. E. of this paper, and specific guide-
lines could be formulated without great effort. The articulate
criteria developed through the policy structure of the "integrated
planning approach" would be expressly valuable in this endeavor.
The effect of such a program would be a more accurate measure
of the value and effectiveness of Navy master planning than has
been provided in this paper, which could then substantiate or
reject the findings and conclusions advanced.
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NOTES: PART III
1 Branch, Melville C, "Continuous City Planning", American
Society of Planning Officials, Planning Advisory Service No. 20
(Chicago, Illinois, July 1974)
2 Schlesinger, James R., "Organizational Structures and Planning"
(Santa Monica, California: The RAND Corporation, undated),
pp. 5-6
3 Ibid., pp. 9-10 and 25
4 Veech, J. A., "Installation and Development Planning", The Navy
Civil Engineer (Naval Construction Battallion Center, Port Hueneme,
California, Jan./Feb. 1967), pp. 16-17
5 Altshuler, Alan A., "The City Planning Process" (Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell University Press, 1965), pp. 335
6 Branch, Melville C, op.cit.
7 Fagin, Henry, "The Policies Plan: Instrumentality for a Community
Dialogue" (University of Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, 1965)
8 Rondinelli, Dennis A., "Urban Planning as Policy Analysis:
Management of Urban Change", Journal of the American Institute
of Planners (Washington, D. C, January 1973), pp. 13-22
9 Ibid., p. 15
10 Commander, Naval Facilities Engineering Command, Alexandria,
Virginia, memorandum of 11 April 1974 to Chief of Naval Operations,
Washington, D. C.
11 Jortberg, Rear Admiral R. F., Office of the Chief of Naval Operations,
Washington, D. C, personal communication of 12 December 1975 to
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12 Sanders, Joseph, "Planners for Major Activities", The Navy Civil
Engineer (Naval Construction Battallion Center, Port Hueneme,
California, Summer 1974), pp. 12-13
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COMPOSITE MASTER PLANNING SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE
The following survey questionnaire is a composite of the three
questionnaires sent to each of three master planning interest groups:
(1 ) NAVFAC Headquarters (HQ) and six Engineering Field Divisions
(EFD's); (2) twelve selected Naval installations for which master plans
have been prepared; and, (3) six architect-engineer (A&E) firms which
have prepared master plans for the Navy through planning service con-
tracts.
Since not all questions pertained to all three interest groups, each
question is designated as to its applicability and variations in question
structure are noted.
The responses shown are also designated by group, with NAVFAC
HQ and EFD's placed within the answer block, instal lations placed to
the left, and A&E's placed to the right. The numerical answers represent
the average, or mean value, of responses given by each of the three
groups, thus accounting for fractional values. Narrative responses are
designated by source; i.e., "HQ/EFD's" (NAVFAC), "INST'S" (installa-
tions), and "A&E's". Number shown in parentheses are the actual
number of nominal responses to a given question and do not represent an
ordinal rating or mean interval value.
v^rt
DEPARTMENT Oi- 'MIC NAVY
WESTERN DIVISION
NAVAL FACILITIES Ei-.'CNCERiMG COM.'.'AMB
P.O. BOX 727






Commanding Officer, Western Division, Naval Facilities
Engineering Command
Distribution List
Subj: Evaluation of the Navy Master Planning Program
End: (I) Survey Questionnaire for Evaluation of the Navy Master
Plan Program
1. This Command is sponsoring a program of graduate study in Urban
and Regional Planning for Mr. Robert Forsyth, a senior member of our
Facilities Planning staff. The study is being accomplished at San
Jose State University, where Mr. Forsyth Is on leave of absence until
his graduation in June 1976.
2. Mr. Forsyth has elected to conduct an evaluation of the Navy's
Master Planning Program as the topic for his thesis dissertation;
a choice which is fully supported by this Command. To provide a
more complete factual background for analysis of the Program's overall
value and effectiveness, Mr. Forsyth has prepared a survey questionnaire
for completion by the Manager and senior staff members of your Master
Planning Branch. The questionnaire, furnished as enclosure (I),
solicits a comprehensive response to questions regarding the organization,
operation and workload of your Branch, and an evaluation of fhe Program
on the basis of goal attainment, planning methodology, plan format and
contents, plan Implementation, productivity of planning output (quantity
and quality), internal management of the Program, external Impacts on
planning, and alternatives to the Program structure.
3. it is requested that the questionnaire be completed and returned to
Mr. Forsyth at his residence, 43 Pine Avenue, San Carlos, CA 94070,
by 1 December 1975.
4. White individual attitudes on the content are desirable, it is
suggested that the responses reflect, where possible, a consensus
among staff personnel. Although the questionnaire has been directed
to the Engineering Field Divisions, a response from Naval Facilities




5. Your cooperation In this effort will be greatly appreciated, both
by Mr. Forsyth and this Command. Your office will receive a copy of
SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE
EVALUATION OF THE NAVY MASTER PLANNING PROGRAM
A. INTRODUCTION: This survey Questionnaire is submitted in
connection with an evaluation of the Navy's Master Plan-
ning Program. The evaluation is being conducted as a
research project for graduate study in Urban and Region-
al Planning at San Jose State University. The study
will take a comprehensive look at the overall quality
and effectiveness of the Program as it has evolved, and
appraise its merits on the basis of observed results.
Installations having a history of experience with approved
Master Plans are encouraged to participate in this effort,
with particular emphasis on their opinion of the effective-
ness of the Plan in guiding the orderly and efficient
development of the installation physical plant. Your
cooperation in completing this questionnaire, as it app-
lies to your installation, will be greatly appreciated.
B. BACKGROUND:
1. Installation Title: (Eight, west coast Naval installations)
(See listing in Notes - Part I - no. 65)
2. Date Master Plan started: April 1966 (earliest)
3. Date Master Plan approved: March 1974 (latest)
4. Have their been any significant changes in the mission,
tasks, workload or base loading at your installation
since completion of the Master Plan? If so, describe:
(Three installations noted changes in mission or tasks )
(Two installations noted a workload increase, two, a
decrease)
(Two installations noted a base loading decrease)
5. Have their been any significant changes in the surround-
ing community, (physical/environmental/political/etc. )
,
since completion of the Master Plan, which would
require its revision or updating? If so, describe:
(Six instances of environmental, physical and political
changes, causing impacts on the master plan, were noted)
SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE
EVALUATION OF THE NAVY MASTER PLANNING PROGRAM
A. INTRODUCTION: This survey questionnaire is submitted in
connection with an evaluation of the Navy's Master Plan-
ning Program. The evaluation is being conducted as a
research project for graduate study in Urban and Region-
al Planning at San Jose State University. The study
will take a comprehensive look at the overall quality
and effectiveness of the Program as it has evolved, and
appraise its merits on the basis of observed results.
Architect-Engineering firms having a history of profess-
ional experience in contract preparation of Master Plans
for Naval and Marine Corps installations are encouraged
to participate in this effort, with particular emphasis
on the quality of the plans produced and the procedures
used in their development. Your cooperation in complet-
ing this questionnaire, as it applies to your previous
association with the KTavy ' s Master Planning Program,
will be greatly appreciated.
B. BACKGROUND:
1. Firm Title: (Three, California firms - names witheld )
2. Title of Master Plan Contract: Naval Electronic Labora-
tory Center, San Diego, Ca. ; Naval Regional Medical
Center, San Diego, Ca. ; Naval Amphibious Base, Coronado,
California.
3. Date of contract award: June 1970; June 1971; June 1972
4. Date of contract termination; July 1971; May 1973;
December 1975
5. Were you thoroughly familiarized with all relevant
Navy planning directives and criteria at the outset
of the project? YES (0) SOMEWHAT (3) NO (0) .
6. Were you given available background and statistical
data on the installation at the outset of the pro-
ject? YES (3) NO (0)
7. If the answer to the above question is "yes", of
what relative value was this material in preparation
of the Master Plan? HIGH (O) MODERATE (2) LOW ( 1
)
.
8. If the answer to the above question is other than
"high", please explain the limitations below.
The data was largely outdated and incomplete.
SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE
EVALUATION OF THE NAVY MASTER PLANNING PROGRAM
A. ORGANIZATION and OPERATION: (HQ & EFD ' S only)
1. Number of professional/technical personnel
in your master planning branch? .0
2. Professional/technical backgrounds of personnel,








Other (identify) (Social. Sciences.)
3. Organizational concept for master planning - (check)
Fixed teams - makeup remains constant
Flexible teams - makeup tailored to job
a. If "fixed team" concept, how are team responsi-
bilities assigned? (check)
Geographic location of installation
Mission characteristics of installation
Major claimant or sponsor command
Other (identify) (Nature of Assignment)
4. Given a "typical" master planning assignment for
in-house accomplishment, what do you consider as








Why? Team leader organizes, schedules and coordinate s -
Less than three team planners lowers productivi ty -
More than th^ee are difficult to manage effectively.
Organizational structure. Enclose your organizational
chart, or explain the branch makeup, noting specific
functions of each section. (Typical organization is
two master planning teams and one technical support
seccion, for facility siting reviews, GDM administra-
tion and con^nc 4: o^ swiat studies of "current" nature)..
Indicate how, (by whom), each of the following










Master plan EIA's (Team leader and planners)
Architectural concept (Team leader and plabners)
Site review/approval (Techical support section)
GDM administration (Technical support section
(consider above items only as they relate to specific
master plans under preparation).
Use of SFPPS data. Rate the following questions on
a "1" to "5" basis, with "1" being the highest rating,
"5" the lowest. (SFPPS data = OPNAV form series, etc.)
a. To what extent has this data been used
in master plan preparation?
b. How satisfactory has it been for this
purpose, in terms of reliability?
1.1
2.7
B. WORKLOAD DATA: (HQ & EFD ' s only)
1. Total number of master plans and regional complex
plans assigned within your geographic area?
2. Number of master plans and regional complex plans
completed or underway, since June 1968?
3. Number of master plans and regional complex plans
updated or under update action, since June 1968?.
4. Number of plans listed under "2" and "3" above





Number of major, targeted planning studies, other
than master plans or regional complex plans, that
have been accomplished since June 1968? (identify
nature, such as Feasability Study, AICUZ, etc.
(Responses were inconclusive)
Indicate the relative distribution, by percent of
total manhours, of in-house resources for FY 1975,
for each category shown. (Code 202 effort only).
a. Master plans/regional complex plans, in-house 38-
b. Master plans/regional complex plans, A&E admin. 3+
c. Special studies, targeted, in-house/ A&E admin. 14
d. Special studies, non-targeted, in-house/A&E. * 13
e. GDM administration, if Code 202 function.... 8-
f. Site review/certification, if Code 202 10+
g. Technical support (graphics, photography, B_
report writing/editing, etc., excluding clerical).
h. Other (identify) . . (Responses .were .inconclusi ve) 6
*Feasability studies, detailed siting studies,
economic analyses, relocation, land exchange, etc.
Non-targeted workload items, as discussed above, are
usually generated from outside sources. List below
the primary originators of these studies, based on













8. Indicate the relative impacts, in terms of Code 202
time/resource allocation, of the non-targeted work-
load items discussed above. Rank in order, "1" to "6",












EVALUATION: Note - where an evaluative question is proceeded
by a single box, it is intended that the answer
(HQ & EFD's, be weighted on a scale of "I" to "5", with "1"
INST's, and representing the highest rating/largest value/
A&E's). most positive response, and "5" representing
the lowest rating/smallest value/most negative
response. A rating of "3" should indicate a
neutral, average, or undecided position.
1. GOAL ATTAINMENT: OPNAVTNST 11010. IF defines "Shore Install-
ation Master Planning" as, "The scientific art of compre-
hensive planning performed for an activity or a complex of
activities to assure the timely and orderly physical
develop of facilities required to support present and
future military operations. This process blends consider-
ations of the total environment including physical charac-
teristics, operational necessities, human interests, and
areas of mutual interest beyond station boundaries."
NAVFACINST 11010.45 defines a "Master Plan", as approved
by CNO or CMC, as "...the official planning document for
the Naval activity or complex of activities covered by
the Plan. It represents in graphic, narrative and tabu-
lar form the present composition of the activity and
proposes the timely, efficient and orderly physical devel-
opment required to perform its assigned mission and to
meet its planned operational workload as quantified in the
statement of Logistic Support Requirements, reference (c)
.
The Master Plan also provides information useful in
planning the operational expansion of the activity beyond
its present mission, up to its maximum capability."
Subsequent revisions of the NAVFACINST 11010.45 have
expanded on these definitions by emphasizing the inter-
face with state, regional and metropolitan planning
goals and development plans adjacent to activity bound-
aries, and the necessity for sensitive consideration of
the physical and social environment.
Assumming that these definitions constitute planning
goals or objectives to be attained through implementation
of the Navy's Master Planning Program:
a. How closely do you consider that the master planning
process, as outlined in the instructions and as con-
ducted in your office, has adhered to the stated
goals and objectives? (consider adherence in terms
of both stated procedures and actual procedures, and
rate on the basis of "1" to "5", for each category
shown on the following page).
Stated Actual
2.3, , N/A
1) Methodology of Plan preparation
2.0














In what areas, and to what extents, has the Master
Planning Program been successful in meeting the
stated goals? (explain) .
HQ/EFD's - Quite successful, as a general framework
INST's. - Fairly successful in land use & facility s i ti ng
A & E's - Quite well in all respects but implementation
In what areas, and to what extents, has the Master
Planning Program failed to meet the stated goals?
HQ/EFD's - Preparation too lengthy - plans subiectsto change
INST's. - Response to current rea'ts. - support for funding
A & E's - Implementation, which is slow and inconsis tent
To what factors do you attribute the areas of failure?
HQ/EFD's - Personnel rotation - Unforeseen changes - lack of
communication
.
INST's. - Unforeseen changes - Inadequate implementation
support.
A & E's - Economic/political factors beyond planner' s
control.
Do you believe that the stated goals are; (check)
Too General | Too Specific
7]




Can you suggest a better, (more realistic or precise)
statement of policies, goals or objectives on which
to base the Master Planning Program?
HQ/EFD's - No
INST's. - More attention to phasing/SFPPS ^id-range devel
A & E's. - Drop use of the word, "timely"
Do you consider that there are other significant
goals to be attained, even though they need not be






NAVFACINST 11018. 45 , with subsequent
revisions, outlines a precise method-
ology for accomplishment of Master Plans,
including Scope of Work, Data Gathering,
Field Investigation, Planning Analysis
and Concept Development, Coordination and
Review, Publication, Submission, Approval
and Updating. In your opinion:
a. How relevant is this methodology to the attainment
of stated goals and objectives?
(rate on the basis of "1" to "5") 2.2 2.0
Do you believe that the methodology is: (check)
Too LimitedToo Extensive 3 .
5
Irrelevant
Satisfactory as stated 1.0 3 Other (explain)
1.5j
c. Which elements of the Master Plan Methodology do you
consider to be the most sensitive to Master Plan
quality , and why?
HQ/EFD's - Planning Anal. & Concept Devel. - Field Invest
A&E's. - Scope of Work and Planning Program (+ above)
d. Which elements of the Master Plan Methodology do you
consider to be the most troublesome to accomplish,
and why?
HQ/EFD's - Coordination and Review - Publication
A & E's. - Coordination and Review - Data Gathering
e. Which of these elements would you add, delete or
modify, to arrive at a better Master Plan Methodology?
HQ/EFD's - (Responses were inconclusive)




and A & E's.)
c.
NAVFACINST 11010.45 and subseouent
revisions outlines the required
format and contents for Master Plans
Format items include Executive Sum-
mary, Introduction, Area Factors,
Installation Description, Planning
Analysis and Development Concepts,
and Recommendations, with Appendices
Contents items include various maps
and plans, augmented by charts,
tables, diagrams and photographs
as necessary to suit specific situ-
ations. In your opinion:
How relevant are the specified Format and Contents
items to the attainment of stated goals and 2.1r~





How useful is the end-item document to each of the






3 NAVFAC / EFD [Ul
4J Other (explain) (DOD .-. .SECNAV.t .CNO .- .etc* 1
.
Which items of the Format and Contents do you
consider to be the most important to the quality
and usefullness of the Master Plan, and Why?
HQ/EFD's - Planning Anal./Devel. Concepts - Recommendations
INST's. - Same as HQ/EFD's
A & E's. - Same as HQ/EFD's, + Executive Summary
Which items do you consider to be the least important?
HQ/EFD's - Area Factors - Installation Description
INST's. - Same as HQ/EFD's
A & E's. - Area Factors - Introduction
What items of the Format and Contents would you add,
delete or modify to arrive at a better Master Plan
document? (explain) .All = Reduce items noted above -
INST's. - Add Basic Facilities Requirements List and
Project Phasing and Priority list.
NOTE: Supplemental, page included to show alternate
question 3.b asked of Installations, shown in box .
FORMAT and CONTENTS: NAVFACINST 11010.45 and subsequent
revisions out linos the required
format and con Lents for Master Plane*.
Format items include Executive Sum-
mary, Introduction, Area Factors,
Installation Description, Planning
Analysis and Development Concepts,
and Recommendations, with Appendices.
Contents items include various maps
and plans, augmented by charts,
tables, diagrams and photographs
as necessary to suit specific situ-
ations. In your opinion:
a. How relevant are the specified Format and Contents
items to the attainment of stated goals and I I
objectives? (rate on the basis of "1" to "5").| |
b. How useful has the end-item document been in each of
the following contexts? (rate on the basis of "1" to "5")
1) Guide for preparation of project sumittals 3.0|
2) Guide for physical plant management 3.2|
3) Guide for facilitating community interface 3.p|
4
)
Other (explai n ) Car.i.£f.ing. .guicfe .f,o.r. Aqt^vAty
)
l.l]
c. Which items of the Format and Contents do you
consider to be the most important to the quality
and usefullness of the Master Plan, and Why?
d. Which items do you consider to be the least important?
e. What items of the Format and Contents would you add,




4. PLAN IMPLEMENTATION: Master Plans are implemented
through the processes of construc-
(HQ/EFD's and tion programming, site review and
INST's. only) certification, GDM administration
and continuing liason with the
subject installation and its chain-
of-command. In your opinion:
a. How closely has the ensuing physical development
of installations followed the Master Plan 3.0
recommendations? (rate on basis of "1" to "5"). 2.2
Where Master Plan recommendations have been followed,
has the actualization generally been closer to the
letter , or the spirit of the recommendations? (circle
the term which is more applicable). ("Spirit", all cases)
To what factors do you attribute observed major devi-
ations in Master Plan implementation? (rate the fac-
tors shown below on a scale of "1" to "5").
3.4r-
1) Lack of coordination/concern in programming P» 6
3.4i
2) Lack of coordination/concern in site review ft. 5
3.4r
3) Lack of coordination/concern in GDM admin. ft. 5
3.3
4) Ineffective liason with Installation/sponsor
2.21 [
L2J5) Other (specify)
d. What do you consider to be the most important factors
in successful Plan implementation, and why?
HQ/EFD's - Coordination between all parties involved
INST's. - Regular and frquent updating - funding support
e. What do you consider to be the least important factors
in successful Plan implementation, and why?
HQ/EFD's - General Development Map administration
INST's. - Retention of unsupported projects
f. Considering your geographic area as a whole, to what
extent do you feel that Master Plans have been
accepted by the subject installations?
(rate on the basis of "1" to "5")
g. What would you suggest to improve the process of
consistent and timely Master Plan implementation?
(use separate sheet for response) (see top of next page)
8
2.4
HQ/EFD's - Shorten preparation & review process - provide a
staff planner at major installations
INST's. - Increase Sponsor recognition - reular review/update
5. PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS:
(HQ/EFD's, INST's.
and A & E' s.
)
This issue is concerned with
the overall effectiveness of
the Navy's Master Planning
Program in satisfying military
requirements at the local level,
and in responding to changing
situations within the military
establishment.
What do you consider to be the most significant
"real" facilities development needs at the major-
ity of Naval and Marine Corps installations?
(rate the categories below in order, "1" to "8").
1) Definition of general land use boundaries,
affording functional compatability and ex-3 . lr 1
pansion potential in facilities development. 2. 6| 3.3
2) Satisfaction, through site allocation, of 3.1
all activity BFRL requirements.
4) Resolution of access, circulation and
parking problems.
5) Replacement/rennovation of substandard
facilities.
3.6 2.0
3) Specific site allocations for facilities 3.3





6) Statement of architectural character
and overall base attractiveness goals.
7) Protection of existing real estate and
facilities from community encroachment
"T~315. a
4.2T
8) Other (explain) HQ/EFD's - Evaluation of
problems and capabilities: INST's. - 5. Of
Priorities for implementation: A&E ' s -





How well do you believe that the Navy Master 3.1"
Planning Program has satisfied the "real"
facilities development needs of Naval and
Marine Corps installations? (rate on basis of "1" to "5")
c. Are you aware of instances where the Master Plan
had no appreciable positive effect on the install-
ation? YES 2 NO 4 .
d. Are you aware of instances where the Master Plan
had a negative effect on the installation?
YES NO 6 (explain, if "yes").
1.5
e. How well does the Master Plan Program accommo-
date unforseen changes in installation mission,
tasks, workload, base loading, etc.? (rate on
the basis of "1" to "5") ILJ
(HQ/EFD's only)
f. How well does the Master Plan Program accommo-
date the full spectrum of characteristics
among various installations, such as nature of
mission, geographic location, configuration,
physical plant, etc.? (rate on the basis of
"1" to "5")
(HQ/EFD's only)
g. How well does the Master Plan Program accommo-
date changes in Congressional/DOD/CNO policy,
such as MCON funding availability, National
defense posture, pollution abatement, energy
conservation, natural and physical resources
management, social standards and amenities,
etc.? (rate on the basis of "1" to "5")
(HQ/EFD's only)
h. The above three questions elicit a subjective
response to generalized situations, concerning
the flexibility of the Master Plan Program in
meeting varying circumstances and unexpected
developments outside the sphere of the planners
'
control. Please state here, those specific
factors which you believe to be the most signifi-
cant or troublesome to effective conduct of the
Program. State any suggestions you may have for
mitigating the situation. (HQ/EFD's only)
Make the master planning process more flexible -
Improve coordination between all parties involved .
o
What do you consider to be the most significant
overall benefits provided or promised by a Master
Plan? (rank listed items in order, "1" to "12").
(list provided on next page)
10




2) Accomplishment of NAVFAC/EFD M.P. targets l|l.5xxx
3 - 7m
3) Support to project site review/certification f7 .8 5. 5
2.9t 1
6.^5.04) Support of construction programming
5) Basis and support for construction funding
6) Allocation of compatible land use
7) Validation of sites for key facilities
8) Provision of sites for all BFRL items
2.1
6.9
9) Protection of installation from community
encroachment
10) Guide for orderly and economical develop-
ment of installation physical plant
11) Generation of concern for base attractiveness [7.3
7.3











3 . Ojl . 7
9.0
7.0
Who derives the most benefit from Master Plans?
(rank in order, "1" to "5").
3 - 3r—
I
1 ) DOD/CNO P.0J3 . 5
2.4i
2 ) NAVFAC/EFD [2 . 1\2 . 5
1.8r





Sponsor Command P.813 .
2.51
5) Other (identify) .(Cpmrnypj-.ty) ^xx|5.0
In summary, indicate your priorities for improve-
ment of the overall quality and effectiveness of
the Navy Master Planning Program. (rank in order,
"1" to "5").
3.0
1) Revise goals and objectives..
2 Revise methodology
3) Revise format and contents...












5) Other (explain) &$<3Vl$V . P]-?P. Feyiev/ypdate. - {cxxXX XXX
establishment of funding priorities
.
11
6. PRODUCTIVITY: QUANTITY and QUALITY: This issue is con-
cerned with produc-




a. How would you rate the productivity of your
branch in terms of quantity output, i.e.,
number of Master Plans completed/underway,
as compared to established targets? (rate
on the basis of "i" to "5")
2.3
b. How would you rate this productivity in terms
of "ideal" or "absolute" output, irrespective
of established targets? (rate "1" to "5")
2.5
c. How would you rate the productivity of your
branch in terms of quality output, i.e.,
content, appearance, usefullness, etc., of
Master Plans? (rate "1" to "5")
1.3
d. Since June 1968, how many installation master plans/
naval complex regional plans has your branch com-
pleted through at least the preliminary stage ? 18.7
1) How many of these have been approved by CNO ? 12.7
2) How many have been accepted by the subject
installation without significant change? 17.
2
3 ) How many have been accepted by NAVFAC
without significant change? 16.7
Where significant changes were required, how would
you explain the reasons? Icheck the appropriate
boxes and weight the respose, "1" to "5", depending
on relative impact of the item selected)
.
ITej
Change in installation mission, workload, etc.
Other "structural" change (explain)
Inadequate compilation/analysis of data
Ineffective communication with installation. . . |4. q
Disagreement of basic/general plan concepts...
Disagreement of specific development proposals






In general, have Master Plans prepared by A&E
required more (4) or less (2)_ time to complete




g. Regarding the above question, how significant
has the time difference been? (rate "1" to "5")
h. In general, have Master Plans prepared by A&E
been of higher (D or lower (->) quality than
those accomplished in-house? (check one item)
.
i. Regarding the above question, how significant
has the quality difference been? ("1" to "5").
j. In general, do you prefer accomplishment of
Master Plans by in-house (6 ) or A&E (0) effort?
(check one item). Explain your reason.
Navy planners more familiar with, and have better
access to data sources and key personnel. Can absorb
impact of changes and delays more easily.
k. Given the conditions that a certain level of Master
Plan output must be maintained, in terms of both
quantity and quality , and that a completed Master
Plan of marginal quality is" still better than no
Master Plan at all, which do you consider to be
more important to the Navy?
1) Maximum quantity with marginal quality,
2) Maximum ouality with marginal Quantity.
(2)
(4)
Comments ? Question is unfair, as both are needed and
of equal importance. If choice must be
made, have to opt for quality .
1. Indicate, by rank, your opinion of the major obsta-
cles to achievement of high productivity in Master
Plan output. Consider both quantity and quality
aspects, and rate each item on the basis of "1" to "5"












Unforseen changes in internal
or external environment
Lack of competence/motivation
among Navy planners cLi
ll_l
Constraints imposed by estab-





Obstructions within the EFD
management , 3.6






Extensive periods of review/
pending guidance


















m. For your top-ranked items above, what would you
suggest as a means to improve Master Plan product-
ivity, in terms of both quantity and quality output?
Modify, expedite or eliminate the review procedures -




This issue is concerned with the
capability of the EFD to effectively
meet Master Planning Program require-
ments and targets, within the scope
of available resources and prevail-
ing management policies.
a. Are you able to effectively meet assigned Master Plan
targets within the scope and configuration of present
resources and prevailing local management policies?
Always (0) Most of time ( 5
)
Sometimes (D Never (0)
b. If answer above is other than "always", do you attri-
bute this inability primarily to; (rank in order, " 1 " to "5")
Manpower shortages CU3
Functional organization P* ^
Management policies 2«S
Personnel malaise P • £
Other (explain) boa
If you could augment your present resources, what would














How would you rate the degree of professional communi-
cation between members of your staff, i.e., the extent
of agreement on standardized planning concepts,
approaches and techniques?
[
(rate on basis of "1" to "5") ILtil
Regarding the question above, how important do you
consider this to be? (rate on basis of "1" to "5"). 1.8
15
f. Recognizing that, on the one hand, master planning is
a time-consuming, complicated process, and on the
other hand, that excessive delays perpetrate addition-
al work, as a result of obsolescence and redundancy,
what do you consider to be the "optimal" time required
for completion of a Master Plan? For this purpose,
assume a Plan of typical complexity, and a work
schedule commencing with the initial assignment and
extending through submittal to NAVFAC. Assume a
"reasonable" amount of time allocated to presenta-
tations and review, and to publication. (Responses of
HQ, 5-EFD's, and 3-A&E's).
<3 months (0) 3-6 months (1) 6-9 months ( 1
)
9-12 months ( 5
)
12-18 months (2) > 18 months.
g. What do you consider to be a "reasonable" time to be
allocated to presentations and review periods, as
reflected in the above schedule, assuming that they
occur at the preliminary and pre-final stages, and
at both the local and Washington, D.C. levels?
(Responses of HQ, 5-EFD's, and 3-A&E's)
<3 weeks (0) 3-6 weeks (3) 6-9 weeks (3)
9*12 weeks (2) > 12 weeks (0)
h. If actual experience indicates more time expended
for presentations and review periods than you con-
sider "reasonable", what would you suggest as a means
to expedite this process?
(All) = Various possibilities, but no strong probabi lities
Presentation and review is a necessary, if
frustrating reality of master planning.
i. In your experience, are substantial delays in Master
Plan preparation due to diversion of team personnel
to other, non-targeted jobs of the brush-fire cate-
gory which do not contribute directly to the Plan
accomplishment? Yes (2) Somewhat (4) No ( ) .
(HQ/EFD response only)
j. If your answer above is other than "no", how severe
do you consider the impact on productivity to
be? (rate on the basis of "1" to "5") E.2
k. Do you consider this manpower diversion to be an ines-
capable consequence which must be accommodated?
(HQ/EFD response only)
Yes (3) Somewhat (3) No (0)
16
If your answer to the previous question was other than
"yes", how would you correct the situation? (rate in
order of preference, "1" to "5").
1) Reorganize internal functions












m. Do you feel that the major problems with effective
accomplishment of the Master Planning Program lie at
the Headquarters level? YES (D NO (5)
n. If your answer to the above question was "yes", what
would you recommend to mitigate the problems? Con-
sider the requirements of the Master Plan instruction,
Headquarters" management and administrative policies, etc
HQ/EFD's - Expedite the Washington level review process.
Do you feel that the major problems with effective
accomplishment of the Master Planning Program lie at
the local EFD level? YES (3.5) NO 12.5) .
If your answer to the above question was "yes",, what
would you recommend to mitigate the problems? Con-
sider organizational structure, local management
policies, manpower limitations, etc.
HQ/EFD's - Increase the size of planning staff -
Reorganize internal funtions for greater
flexibility.
17
8. EXTERNAL IMPACTS: This issue is concerned with the grow-
ing requirement for interface between
(HQ/EFD's only, the Navy and both the civilian community
except questions and other governmental agencies, in
d.,e. and f.) matters relating to planning and devel-
opment.
a. To what relative extent is your branch involved in
in this type of interface, compared to the level of
of similar activity in the 1968-1970 time frame?
(rate on the scale of "1" to "5")
b. In general, how much importance do you place on
this type of interface? (rate on "1" to "5" basis) . [2.1
l^J
c. To date, how beneficial to the Navy do you feel
that this type of interface has been? (rate on
"1" to "5" basis) 2.9
d. How well do you believe the Master Plan Program accommo-
dates public concerns regarding: (rate each item on a
"1" to "5" basis)
2.2-
2.
3.6(3.01) The use and disposition of military property..
2) The status of environmental quality [2.112.0
3.7
3) Social and economic impacts on communities 2.32.5
1.62.0
To what relative extent should Navy planners main-
tain interface with the civilian community during
the master planning process? (rate on "1" to "5" basis)
Comments? Responses inconclusive, but concensus is
for more interface than in the past.
At what stages of development should Navy Master Plans/
Regional Complex Plans be released for public angency







(5) Other (explain) XXX
Do you believe that interface between the Navy and the
community on matters of planning and development can
be most effectively conducted on the staff level, in
an informal manner, (5) , or on the management level,
in a more formal manner (5) ? (indicate by check mark)
18
h. What actions would you propose, (if any), to achieve
more effective coordination between the Navy and the
community on matters of planning and development?
(Responses were inconclusive, but there was general
concensus that a lot more could, and should, be done
in this matter)
»
9. ALTERNATIVES to MASTER PLANNING: This issue is concerned
with the value of long-
(HQ/EFD's only) range, comprehensive
facilities planning as
currently practiced by
the Navy, and proposes
two alternative concepts
for consideration.
a. No Master Planning: Under this concept, facilities
planning would be limited to administration of the
SFPPS System, (i.e. , establishment of requirements,
engineering evaluation, identification of facilities
excesses and deficits, and programming for their
disposition or satisfaction), the GDM process, facil-
ity siting on a case basis, and accomplishment of
special planning studies as required.
1) Do you recognize any justification for this approach?
(explain) "Yes" = (2) - "No" = (4)
2) What are the major potential benefits? (explain)
"None" = (4) - "Better response to immediate instal-
lation needs" = (2)
3) What are the major potential pitfalls? (explain)
"A chaotic situation, as in the early 1960 ' s -
No comprehensiveness - no consideration for the
environment" - (6) 19
b. Policy Planning: This concept would be an extension
of the "no master planning" approach, in which all
future planning decisions for a given installation
would be based on an approved set of planning and
development policies. These policies would set
general standards for land use allocation, facilities
siting, circulation, architectural character, etc.,
and would be approved by the Command. The policies
may be accompanied by maps and plans where appropriate,
indicating the graphic depiction of these policies
in conceptual form.
1) Do you recognize any justification for this approach?
(explain) "Yes" = (4) - "No" = (1) - "Undecided" = M l
2) What are the major potential benefits? (explain)
Better response to immediate installation needs -
Some degree of order and logic in planning for
development on an incremental basis.
3) What are the major potential drawbacks? (explain)
Lack of clarity on who wj.ll make the major planning
decisions - Lack of "standards" by which to judge
the value of proposals.
c. Other Alternatives? Can you suggest other alternative
approaches which should be considered? If so, please
summarize in the space below.
(No responses).
THIS IS THE END OF THE SURVEY QUESTIONNAIRE.
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